





Title of Thesis:   Cooperation Amid Competition: The Korean Peninsula Security 
Crisis and Building Strategic Trust in US-China Relations 
 
    Megan Cansfield, Bachelor of International Studies, 2017 
 
Thesis Directed By:   Dr. Mary Gallagher 




The North Korean nuclear program and the resulting security crisis on the Korean Peninsula is 
an area of great strategic interest and security concern for both the US and China. However, it 
has consistently perpetuated political contention between the countries despite mutual security 
cooperation efforts. This thesis aims to evaluate the impact of the Korean Peninsula security 
crisis on US-China relations through the lens of trust-cooperation linkages, with the purpose of 
determining the capacities in which bilateral security cooperation on North Korea fosters greater 
strategic trust between the US and China. It illuminates the circumstances and challenges for US-
China security cooperation in contemporary international relations and applies this framework to 
assess the 2003-2007 Six-Party Talks and the 2016 UN Sanctions as case studies of pivotal US-
China security cooperation on North Korea. The thesis demonstrates that these initial 
engagement efforts have led to expanding US-China security cooperation on both North Korea 
and other mutual US-China security issues, which reflects a self-reinforcing “cooperation spiral” 
dynamic that is both representative of increasing strategic trust and conducive to furthering trust-
building through cooperation. These patterns have significant long-term implications for 
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I.1 Strategic Linkages: North Korea, the US, and China 
 
The North Korean nuclear dilemma and the US-China bilateral relationship represent two 
of the most pressing security challenges in contemporary international relations. As a rogue 
regime that has developed its nuclear capability to successfully conduct multiple weapons tests 
while flouting international nonproliferation laws and consistently threatening the US and South 
Korea with nuclear attack, North Korea has proven to be a destabilizing force in East Asia whose 
actions have provoked militarizing responses from neighboring states in recent years. The US 
and China – North Korea’s primary opponent and ally, respectively – are the two states with the 
greatest influence in the Korean Peninsula and the greatest potential to take effective actions 
towards de-escalating the tense situation. As such, the US and China must inevitably be involved 
in any possible solution to the unfolding crisis.  
Although policy coordination will be crucial, US-China relations at present are 
characterized by tension over mutual suspicion of each other’s power and intentions in East Asia 
and the international system at large. The two countries’ bilateral relationship is further 
complicated by their opposing viewpoints on many critical global issues as shaped by their 
differing political systems, histories, and cultural heritages. Cooperation between them is thus 
inherently difficult yet immensely consequential for international security. However, the North 
Korean crisis offers a rare opportunity for US-China strategic coordination based on shared 
national security interests in achieving denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula. If 
the US and China can overcome their differences to increase the frequency and depth of their 
cooperation efforts regarding North Korea, the Korean Peninsula issue could become a starting 
2 
 
point for building the high-level trust and mutual understanding needed to catalyze further US-
China security cooperation, improve long-term bilateral relations, and reduce the risk of a great 
power conflict through joint management of the East Asian regional security environment.1 
 
I.2 Security Cooperation as Trust-Building 
 
As it relates to international relations, strategic trust between states is not simply an 
outcome of but also a key instigator of security cooperation. The parameters of “strategic trust” 
and “security cooperation” as terms will be more clearly delineated in Chapter 1, but since 
entering collaborative engagement between states on issues of national security concern requires 
a certain preexisting degree of trust from each actor, or at least the desire to foster greater trust 
between them, the two concepts are inherently linked. The very process of communicating and 
coordinating policies across involved parties to work towards shared security objectives can in 
turn lead to increased mutual understanding and, ultimately, trust as the outcome as well as the 
cause of security cooperation.2 Since strategic trust is closely intertwined with successful self-
reinforcing patterns of security cooperation and is important in mitigating the likelihood of 
interstate conflict, it is critical that US-China security cooperation on North Korea be analyzed 
with this trust component in mind to fully account for the impacts of such cooperation on actions 
and perceptions within the US-China bilateral relationship. 
Developing a nuanced understanding of the intersection between trust and security 
cooperation in US-China interactions on the Korean Peninsula is particularly important in the 
                                                             
1. Denny Roy, “The North Korea Crisis in Sino-US Relations,” Journal of Comparative Asian 
Development 10, no. 2 (2011): 282. 
 
2. Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2005: 28-29 
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context of current international affairs at the time of writing this thesis in April 2017. The newest 
round of United Nations sanctions against North Korea in March 2016 represents an unusual 
instance of US-China cooperation on North Korea in multilateral forums where the two nations’ 
divergent interests usually inhibit such tangible actions, a development that has not yet been 
extensively researched and analyzed within the context of broader US-China security 
cooperation or Korean Peninsula policy. Recent advancements in the North Korean nuclear 
program over the past year have also heightened the level of urgency and depth of strategic 
consideration with which both American and Chinese policymakers must now address the 
growing crisis. These factors provide the impetus for a re-evaluation of the role that US-China 
relations plays in the Korean Peninsula security crisis as explored in this thesis.  
However, while security cooperation between the US and China is understood to play an 
essential role in facilitating constructive joint approaches to North Korea, the role of strategic 
trust in this cooperation and the US-China bilateral relationship as a whole is comparatively less 
emphasized, despite its relevance as both a critical precondition for and desired result of such 
engagement on the Korean Peninsula. This trust-cooperation nexus for the US and China has not 
been extensively evaluated by the existing literature specifically in relation to the Korean 
Peninsula. Current research primarily takes one of two approaches: focusing on either the lack of 
security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula as a casualty of rivalry and tension in the US-
China relationship,3 4 5 or analyzing US-China strategic distrust as the source of tension in US-
                                                             
3. Soo-Ho Lim, “US-China Conflict: Impact on the Korean Peninsula,” SERI Quarterly 3, no. 4 ((2010): 
124. 
 
4. Roy, “The North Korea Crisis in Sino-US Relations,” 281. 
  
5. Fei-Ling Wang, “Stability with Uncertainties: US-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula,” In The 
United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwan and Seung-Ho Joo (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006): 196. 
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China relations more broadly.6 7 8 By contrast, this thesis seeks to emphasize the critical 
intersections between all three factors by centering its analysis first on the role of strategic trust 
in fostering US-China security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, then on the role of this 
security cooperation in incrementally building the trust needed to lay a foundation for long-term 
improvements in US-China relations.  
 
I.3 Research Questions and Findings 
 
This thesis seeks to answer two guiding questions: (1) How does the North Korean 
nuclear security crisis influence US-China security cooperation in the post-Soviet Union era? (2) 
How does this cooperation contribute to fostering greater strategic trust in the US-China bilateral 
relationship? In addressing these questions, the thesis will challenge the notion of the Korean 
Peninsula as a policy challenge fundamentally obstructive to US-China security cooperation and 
an unequivocal hindrance on US-China relations more broadly. While the thesis does not refute 
the indication that strategic US-China distrust does still exist and hinders bilateral cooperative 
efforts, it does also suggest the importance of equally accounting for a parallel effect from 
existing security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula in facilitating a self-reinforcing trust-
cooperation dynamic, which may prove to have a positive effect overall on long-term US-China 
trust, cooperation, and bilateral relations.  
                                                             
6. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations,” 12. 
 
7. Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015): 11. 
 
8. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” John L. Thornton China 
Center Monograph Series 4. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution (2012): i-iii.  
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To assess these patterns of interconnected security cooperation and trust-building, this 
study provides a qualitative analysis of theoretical and practical perspectives on international 
security cooperation as applicable to the political conditions between the US and China in 
addressing the North Korean nuclear security crisis. It first evaluates two particularly notable 
historical cases of US-China engagement on Korea, the 2003-2007 Six Party talks and the 2016 
United Nations Security Council Resolution, selected for their significance as breakthrough 
moments of high-level US-China security cooperation on North Korea. These two events both 
had pronounced effects in prompting further US-China security cooperation on North Korea and 
other mutual security issues. Through extended analysis of official records and secondary reports 
of US-China cooperation patterns in the years following the events analyzed in these case 
studies, this thesis is able to map and analyze the resulting trajectory of bilateral engagement on 
North Korea and the three prominent parallel security arenas in US-China strategic interaction 
most closely connected with the Korean Peninsula issue: the Taiwan strait crisis, military-to-
military affairs, and counterterrorism. As a result, a clearer picture emerges of how trust built 
through the security cooperation process on North Korea helped establish the conditions 
conducive to broader and deeper US-China cooperation. 
The research findings support this thesis’ conclusion that although conflicts of national 
interests and objectives regarding North Korea have heightened discord in US-China relations, 
the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis has overall led to a beneficial process of gradual strategic 
trust-building that has fostered greater US-China engagement and security cooperation in 
practice. However, the lack of a coordinated US-China strategy towards the Korean Peninsula 
and the remaining paucity of strategic depth and continuity in their cooperation on the issue, 
despite their increasingly frequent engagement, is ultimately reflective of the prevalence of some 
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degree of underlying strategic distrust, which propels the US and China to frame their interests 
and policies towards the Korean Peninsula such that they are at present fundamentally 
irreconcilable. However, the increase in security cooperation itself, regardless of the depth of 
cooperation, has enabled the US and China to develop a higher degree of strategic trust in their 
bilateral relationship that would otherwise be lacking. These patterns indicate the important 
effects of cooperation on the North Korean nuclear crisis as building the trust necessary to 
increase the US and China’s capacity for deeper-level cooperation in the future. Therefore, 
despite the apparent political stalemate between the US and China over the Korean Peninsula, 
the North Korean nuclear crisis could nonetheless provide the necessary precedent and 
mechanisms for furthering the mutually-reinforcing dynamics of strategic trust and security 
cooperation to improve long-term bilateral US-China relations and cooperation on other security 
issues in Northeast Asia. 
In structuring these central claims, this thesis begins by contextualizing the historical 
development and background of the Korean Peninsula security crisis in Chapter 1. The first 
chapter also outlines the conceptual framework for both security cooperation and strategic trust, 
the two international relations phenomena whose intersections within the setting of US-China 
relations on the Korean Peninsula comprise the primary focus of analysis throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 2 examines both the US and China’s unilateral interests and strategy towards 
North Korea after assessing current literature and establishing a theoretical framework for 
understanding US-China security cooperation. It explores the predominant paradigms and 
dynamics of bilateral US-China engagement of North Korea, critically discussing their 
implications for the emergence of a mutually-reinforcing trust-cooperation spiral for the US and 
China in relation to the Korean Peninsula. 
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Chapter 3 analyzes the two most notable historical instances of US-China cooperation on 
North Korea – the 2003-2007 Six-Party Talks and the 2016 United Nations Sanctions – as case 
studies, assessing their significant if limited successes in facilitating subsequent US-China 
security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere as indicative of improving trust-
cooperation dynamics between the US and China. These patterns fit the spiral model of strategic 
interactions in international relations, a key concept that this thesis applies to the Korean 
Peninsula crisis. In this context, the model allows for nuanced descriptive and predictive 
interpretations regarding the emergence of a growing US-China “cooperation spiral” as evident 
through the patterns of increasing security cooperation on North Korea analyzed in these case 
studies. 
Chapter 4 builds on the applicability of the spiral model to US-China cooperation on 
North Korea as established in the previous chapter, assessing how closely the spiral model’s 
predictions of increasing security cooperation based on increasing trust match the present 
dynamics of US-China engagement after the events described in the two case studies detailed in 
this thesis.  The chapter identifies patterns of increased US-China coordination on both Korean 
Peninsula issues and other East Asian regional security issues following on from the patterns of 
engagement outlined in these case studies, specifically focusing on cooperation pertaining to 
Taiwan, military-to-military, and counterterrorism affairs. The presence of both vertical and 
horizontal development in US-China cooperative efforts, referring respectively to continued 
cooperation on the primary issue of North Korea and expanded cooperation into parallel 
dimensions of US-China security engagements as listed previously, is thus shown to reflect the 
presence of an underlying paradigm of incremental trust-building as both caused and influenced 
by growing cooperation dynamics within bilateral US-China engagement on North Korea.  
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Chapter 5 revisits theoretical and practical predictions for future US-China cooperation 
and improved bilateral relations, evaluating them anew in light of the cooperation episodes 
addressed in the research and within the broader trend of increasing US-China engagement on 
the North Korean nuclear issue. The thesis concludes that the critical role of US-China security 
cooperation on the Korean Peninsula in facilitating gradual improvements in the two parties’ 
currently limited engagement towards deeper security cooperation and trust-building efforts will,  
in the long run, ultimately have significant implications for building a strong foundation for 


















Chapter 1  
North Korea and the US-China Rivalry 
 
 The North Korean nuclear dilemma is an issue that has evolved significantly over the past 
six decades since the original Korean Peninsula security dilemma and the North Korean state’s 
founding following the close of the Korean war in 1953. The positions, interests, and stakes of 
the major actors in the situation have also changed over time, and thus understanding the current 
conditions fully requires a knowledge of North Korea’s national background. Similarly, 
understanding the present-day conditions of North Korea’s nuclear program allows for drawing 
parallels to history and assessing the degree to which the security cooperation and trust-building 
concepts are important in efforts from China and the US to stop North Korea’s nuclear 
development using multilateral or bilateral approaches.   
 To offer these valuable perspectives as an analytical tool for assessing US-China security 
cooperation on North Korea, this chapter first aims to situate the Korean Peninsula security crisis 
within the historical development of North Korea’s nuclear program and the contemporary 
geopolitical context, identifying key areas of American and Chinese involvement throughout. 
The chapter then establishes working definitions of security cooperation and strategic trust, 
forming a critical conceptual framework for the analysis of notable cases and patterns of US-
China security cooperation as examined in subsequent chapters. 
 
1.1 North Korea’s Nuclear Development: A Brief History 
 
 The North Korean nuclear saga has played out against a backdrop of regional geopolitics 
shaped by US-China rivalry. The North Korean state was first established with the partition of 
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Korea following the end of World War II in 1945, which designated the 38th Parallel as the 
border separating the newly formed Republic of Korea (ROK), the US-backed democratic state 
in the South, from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the communist regime 
in the North supported by the Soviet Union. Following the beginning of the Korean War with the 
North’s surprise invasion of the South on June 25, 1950, both the Soviet Union and China 
provided aid and military training to the DPRK forces to support its attempt to gain control over 
the full Korean Peninsula. Once the tide began to turn in favor of the combined ROK-US-UN 
forces with their counter-offensive across the 38th Parallel in October 1950, China entered the 
war in support of North Korea with 270,000 Chinese People’s Volunteer Army troops. After 
hostilities in the Korean War were brought to an end by the signing of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement on July 27, 1953, the North maintained strong ties with China that culminated in the 
militarily-binding Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Treaty signed on July 11, 
1961. On the basis of these close historical relations, North Korea has maintained its alliance 
with China through the present, and China has in turn continued to support North Korea despite 
its disruptive antics for its centrality to China’s core strategic interests in East Asia.  
The DPRK initially began its quest for nuclear technology following a nuclear research 
agreement with the Soviet Union, signed in 1956 on the heels of the Korean War stalemate,9 but 
it was unconfirmed whether the North Korean leadership actually had its eyes on nuclear 
weapons or simply nuclear energy production. American satellite imagery first revealed evidence 
of North Korean nuclear activity in 1982 upon sighting the beginnings of a reactor site at 
Yongbyon, which North Korea progressively enhanced towards operational functionality through 
                                                             
9. Walter C. Clemens Jr., “North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence,” Journal 
of East Asian Studies 10 (2010): 129. 
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1988.10 It was primarily amidst contemporaneous foreign relations crises in the 1990s – most 
notably the loss of Soviet patronage with the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991– that North 
Korean leadership fully cemented its ambitions for an internationally recognized nuclear 
weapons program with diplomatic leverage. Having become convinced by this point of the need 
for nuclear weapons to guarantee its own survival in the absence of powerful supporters, the 
North Korean regime soon began earnestly charting a course towards weapon materials and 
technology acquisition.11  
By some measures, the 1990s marked a decade of unprecedented international 
engagement with North Korea with the beginning of US-DPRK direct bilateral meetings and 
South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy, under which South Korea offered aid 
and collaborative industrial projects designed as incentives for North Korean reciprocal 
concessions on its nuclear program. However, the decade also saw the first major crisis related to 
the North Korean nuclear program, which was triggered in 1992 by revelations that the DPRK 
was secretly proceeding with its nuclear weapons enrichment projects in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 prompted an 
urgent international response in the multilateral Six-Party Talks, which continued from 2003 
through 2007 but ultimately failed to produce meaningful progress on curbing the North’s 
nuclear progress. Following the Talks, North Korea shunned international engagement and 
single-mindedly strove to improve its nuclear program. North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 
was followed by others in 2009, 2013, and two in 2016 with greater payloads each time, 
                                                             
10. Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic 
Books, 2013), 194-195. 
 
11.  Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 17-18. 
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demonstrating that Pyongyang possesses both the persisting aim to produce nuclear weapons and 
the increasing capability to do so.12 
 The development of the North Korean nuclear program is fundamentally tied to the 
circumstances of the state’s foundation, since nuclear weapons capability was framed as the key 
to state survival in the decades following the end of the Korean War. The North Korean fixation 
on becoming a nuclear power is most commonly analyzed by international policymakers and 
North Korea watchers in terms of security, military, and political concerns. North Korea’s 
domestic “military-first” policy indicates that this is also the primary lens through which the 
DPRK leadership views its own nuclear program. 13 Indeed, many of the most commonly cited 
speculations of North Korea’s true objectives for nuclear weapons are made on these grounds: 
possibilities include a quest for nuclear deterrence14, desire to mitigate the Kim regime’s 
vulnerability,15 a response to pressure from surrounding nuclear or nuclear-capable states in East 
Asia,16 or the promise of reinforcing the DPRK’s claim to represent the whole Korean Peninsula. 
This question of motives lies at the heart of the debate over appropriate policy responses, since 
the appropriateness of engagement or coercive tactics is subjectively influenced by whether the 
DPRK’s real or perceived intent is to gain a defensive mechanism for nuclear sovereignty or an 
                                                             
12. Nicholas Hamisevicz, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the United States: More Difficult, and 
More Complicated, More Dangerous.” In Utpal Vyas, Ching-Chang Chen, and Denny Roy (Ed.), The North Korea 
Crisis and Regional Responses (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2015): 131-132. 
 
13. Kim Keun-Sik, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Its Rationale, Intentions, and Military-First Politics,” 
Korea Journal 45, no. 4 (2005): 62-63. 
 
14.  Victor Cha and David Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 
(2004): 244-245. 
 
15. You Ji, “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 10, no. 28 (2001): 395.   
 
16. Dingli Shen, “Cooperative Denuclearization Towards North Korea,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 
4 (2009): 176. 
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offensive weapon for plausible first-strike aggression.17 However, the drive for nuclear weapons 
is even more central to the North Korean state than is often realized because the concept of 
absolute sovereignty is a fundamental tenet of the official national ideology known as juche, or 
“self-reliance.” 18 The implications of this association have taken root in North Korea at the 
psychological and institutional level: After North Korea revised its constitution in 2012 to 
enshrine the view that North Korea “is a nuclear-armed state and an indomitable military 
power,” its nuclear weapons program became indefinitely integrated with the nation’s founding 
and organizational document, revealing the degree of prestige, reputation, and security 
significance the state officially attributes to its nuclear program. Now, nuclear weapons are 
framed no longer as just a tool of the state but an integral part of the North Korean state itself, 
reflecting an extension of national juche ideology to nuclear weapons.19  
The overarching geopolitical theme of the Korean Peninsula throughout the post-Korean 
War period is reflected in a Cold War-era balance of the socialist and communist North Korea 
supported by the Soviet Union and the democratic and capitalist South Korea supported by the 
United States. Thus, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the three subsequent decades 
marked a major shift in the dynamics of inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s relations with 
the outside world. This period from 1991-2016 will serve as the temporal focus of this thesis for 
the purpose of situating its analysis of key instances of US-China cooperation events within the 
most modern period of North Korean history, resulting in the framework most representative of 
the current conditions and challenges. 
                                                             
17. Cha and Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” 232. 
 
18. Jein Do, “Nuclear Weapons as Ideology: The Formation of North Korean Nuclear Independence, 1962-
1964,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 28, no. 2 (2015): 181-182.  
 
19. Hamisevicz, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” 131. 
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1.2 Contemporary Context of the Korean Peninsula Security Crisis 
 
North Korea continues to be a particularly relevant challenge to international security and 
US-China relations into current times due to many significant recent developments in its nuclear 
adventurism. North Korea claimed in January 2016 to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb; 
in February 2016, it accomplished a rocket-mounted satellite launch; and in April and later 
August 2016, additional missile tests brought North Korea’s nuclear activity to new heights in 
both scale and frequency, with Pyongyang’s hostile rhetoric intensifying accordingly. The North 
is suspected of endeavoring to accelerate its nuclear technology advancement in the subsequent 
months after claiming to have successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on missiles 
conducive to offensive use.20 Most recently, the DPRK has completed six missile launches 
within the first four months of 2017, raising global alarm over North Korea’s unprecedented rate 
of weapons testing and prompting a renewed focus of political discourse and diplomatic efforts 
on the threat posed by the country’s nuclear program. As of the time of writing in April 2017, it 
still remains uncertain whether North Korea’s current capabilities allow it to credibly threaten 
the American mainland or Hawaii with either nuclear- or non-nuclear-capable intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). However, US Pacific forces stationed in Guam, Japan, and South 
Korea, along with most major East Asian cities and strategic assets that could prove inviting 
targets for a potential preemptive or retaliatory strike, are all well within the North’s ever-
expanding missile range.21 
Despite the international community’s recurring paralysis towards policy solutions, the 
recent escalation of the North Korean nuclear threat has also prompted unprecedented US-China 
                                                             
20. Ibid., 131. 
 
21. Ibid., 131.  
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collaboration. The most recent and prominent such instance occurred on March 2, 2016, when 
both nations voted to pass United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270, the strictest and 
most comprehensive set of multilateral sanctions yet against North Korea.22 This is a rare 
instance of compromise since China and the US usually clash over North Korea, with China 
typically hesitating to take punitive action and the US predictably criticizing the resulting 
shutdown of international efforts contingent on China’s cooperation. Considered in light of other 
prominent historical cases of US-China policy coordination on North Korea – most notably the 
Six-Party Talks from 2003-2007 – along with US-China security cooperation on related issues, 
this raises new questions about the feasibility and circumstances of bilateral cooperation that are 
not adequately accounted for by the older existing research base, creating a need to further 
analyze and contextualize the issue in the rapidly evolving East Asian security environment.  
Fundamental conflicts of interest and different desired outcomes between China and the 
US, explained further in Chapter 2, continue to hinder the international community’s efforts to 
overcome the current political and diplomatic impasse on the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program. This has so far permitted the North to develop its capabilities unchecked and escalate 
its aggression without substantial repercussions. These tensions have proven emblematic of the 
mutual suspicion and lack of trust in the broader US-China relationship: China, North Korea’s 
sole ally, is a rising power looking to take a larger role in regional and global leadership, while 
the US, North Korea’s primary declared enemy after South Korea, is the current hegemon in East 
Asia and aims to maintain its top position in an amenable denuclearized security environment. 
International relations and political specialists on East Asia generally share a consensus that 
while security cooperation on North Korea has contributed to strengthening bilateral US-China 
                                                             
22. Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: New Sanctions, Old Dilemmas,” 
Comparative Connections 18, no. 1 (2016): 91-92. 
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ties, the feasibility and depth of this cooperation in practice has in turn been shaped by the 
general trajectory of US-China relations.23 That is to say, although the US and China hold mutual 
incentives in bringing about a stable non-nuclear Korean Peninsula – a shared objective that 
should itself prompt cooperative engagement on both sides to coordinate a joint solution – it is 
the nature of the very same security issue that emphasizes the ways in which the countries’ 
unilateral interests diverge in the context of US-China strategic competition. Since this dynamic 
is emphasized by the geopolitical circumstances of North Korea, the current nuclear crisis 
simultaneously manifests the obstacles in US-China relations, even as it should theoretically help 
overcome them. 
A substantial amount of scholarship exists on how US-China relations affect the North 
Korean nuclear issue, featuring varying assessments of the two nations’ disparate strategic 
interests,24 levels of influence as key regional actors,25 perceptions of each other as competitors, 
and other factors shaping their policies and North Korea’s reactions. This literature will be 
further evaluated throughout Chapters 3 and 4 as applied to case studies of key US-China 
cooperation on North Korea and patterns of expanding cooperation on parallel security concerns.  
As established previously, the reverse of this two-way connection is also true: North 
Korea poses significant high-stakes challenges with wide-ranging implications for the bilateral 
US-China relationship. This is also evident from US-China diplomatic interactions following 
                                                             
23. Bonnie S. Glaser and Liang Wang, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis”, in Suisheng Zhao (Ed.), China 
and the United States: Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 87. 
24. David Finkelstein, The Military Dimensions of US-China Security Cooperation: Retrospective and 
Future Prospects (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010), 3. 
 
25. Graeme A. M. Davies, “Coercion or Engagement? A Quantitative Test of the Effect of Regional Actors 




significant developments in North Korean nuclear activity that prompted simultaneous though 
separate American and Chinese responses. Subsequent sections of this thesis will describe these 
attempts at diplomatic collaboration between the US and China on the North Korean nuclear 
crisis in greater detail, using two specific instances of successful joint collaboration as historical 
case studies to examine the value of such security cooperation on expanding further cooperation 
and facilitating deeper US-China engagement in the future through incremental trust-building. 
 
1.3 Conceptualizing Security Cooperation 
 
 Security cooperation, the focal point for analyzing US-China relations within this thesis, 
is defined here as any actions with the overarching aim to foster closer ties between participating 
nations and advance the security-based objectives of either or both parties. Security cooperation 
at the state level can take the form of assistance from one state to the other with directed military 
funding transfers, training and equipping forces, humanitarian affairs, arms transfers, military 
equipment sales, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, or training and education related to security 
matters.26 Security cooperation can also be measured on an international scale as engagement on 
security issues in a multilateral capacity, which could include cooperation in peacekeeping 
operations or aligned participation in security-focused international organizations such as the 
United Nations Security Council. A third component often overlooked by the common 
definitions is simply diplomatic engagement on security issues through bilateral or multilateral 
forums, purpose-specific meetings, and interstate dialogue at any level of formality. These 
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occurrences indicate positive communication and possible consideration for collaborative action 
on issues of importance to the fundamental integrity of the states involved.  
 The value of security cooperation can extend to a range of benefits and functions for both 
the instigator and partner nations. Peacetime security cooperation on the military front in 
particular fulfills several key functions that are important for building the foundations for peace 
and further cooperation: building partner capacity, strengthening trust, and alleviating conditions 
or tensions that could lead to conflict.27 By developing common thinking about strategic issues 
and reducing impediments to cooperation, these methods can help to solve information 
asymmetry issues by assuring allies and partners about a cooperative state’s intentions, deter 
aggression by dissuading potential adversaries, and shorten the duration of pre-existing hostilities 
by assisting in partner states’ military efforts. These well-recognized objectives for security 
engagement to preempt the potential emergence of conflicts or national security threats have 
been normalized and integrated into “Phase 0” of the US defense strategy over the past several 
decades.28 With US-China cooperation in particular, there are no significant patterns of sustained 
security cooperation between the nations’ defense-military establishments with almost no direct 
military cooperation.29 This absence of cooperation is most likely due to prevailing national 
security concerns, further indicating that the nations view each other primarily in competitive 
rather than cooperative terms. 
In the context of this thesis, the aforementioned components of security cooperation are 
applied to the North Korean nuclear security crisis to mean bilateral or multilateral US-China 
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engagement on issues of mutual security concern in East Asia. Two types of security cooperation 
in particular are evaluated: (1) unprecedented instances of “primary” security cooperation that 
represent new developments explicitly addressing a given issue in the North Korean situation, as 
well as (2) further “secondary” cooperation on North Korea or other mutual security issues that 
represents an effort to build upon a previous instance of primary security cooperation on North 
Korea and expands the degree or breadth of engagement facilitated by the preceding instance that 
prompted this new cooperation. Taken together as the basis for larger patterns of increasing 
cooperation over the full period of analysis from 1991 to the present, these instances of primary 
and secondary security cooperation are indicative of a larger sustained US-China cooperation 
spiral whereby strategic trust begets security cooperation and vice versa, resulting in 
progressively more instances of security cooperation and thus opportunities to further develop 
trust. Taken separately, these primary and secondary cooperation patterns are themselves self-
contained spirals of increasing cooperation, some of many types of engagement that ultimately 
help build the trust factors necessary to proceed towards US-China security cooperation on North 
Korea. Chapters 3 and 4 respectively compare the occurrence and effectiveness of primary and 
secondary security cooperation as related to US-China relations, demonstrating the self-
reinforcing nature of the spiral model as applied to security cooperation fostering further 
cooperation in the future, but also displaying the necessity of trust in moving this cooperation to 
the deeper level required to move further up the spiral model towards greater cooperation 
overall. 
1.4 Conceptualizing Strategic Trust 
 
Integral to the feasibility and efficacy of security cooperation between two states in an 
international system is mutual trust in the other side to reciprocate positive engagement and 
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maintain benign intentions. Kydd defines trust in international relations as “a belief that the other 
side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation, and mistrust as a belief that the 
other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one’s cooperation.”30 Trust is an integral 
component of the theories of international relations detailed in Chapter 2 to frame the North 
Korean security crisis within US-China relations: the security dilemma exacerbates mistrust by 
obscuring intentions, power transition theory warns of heightened distrust as a result of rivalry 
between established and rising powers, and the Thucydides Trap expands on power transition 
theory to predict that these distrustful dynamics will eventually result in conflict between actors 
in these positions. In relation to security cooperation as defined in the preceding section, one 
state’s perception of the other’s trustworthiness will affect whether that state is willing to risk 
compromising its own security or pursuit of unilateral interests to engage in security cooperation 
with the other party.31 Therefore, a degree of trust is often considered an essential precondition 
for security cooperation to occur between states.32 33 In the long term, a gradual increase of trust 
between the parties – most feasibly through repeated interactions of security cooperation, as 
described by the spiral model for cooperation in Chapter 3 – must be present if security 
cooperation is to increase in depth or breadth.34 Since the linkages between security cooperation 
and trust are self-reinforcing, the engagement prompted by security cooperation allows for a 
greater exchange of information and a mitigation of the constraints on perceiving other states’ 
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true intentions, which can itself have important implications for fostering trust.35 Therefore, both 
orders can hold true: security cooperation can be the series of actions taken first and through 
which the trust to continue expanding cooperation is developed, or trust can lead to security 
cooperation that in turn reinforces and improves the existing levels of trust.  
This distinction of the relationship between trust and security cooperation is particularly 
pertinent in the context of US-China relations. For the US and China, strategic distrust inherently 
complicates cooperation on mutual issues like the Korean Peninsula, and yet the scarcity of 
extensive security cooperation also precludes the countries from opportunities to build the trust 
needed for stronger bilateral relations.36 Besides the framework of the international system and 
geopolitical context that work to perpetuate US-China strategic rivalry and distrust, the 
challenges in developing strategic trust in the US-China context may stem from the countries’ 
different cultural and political conceptions of the linkages between trust and security 
cooperation.37 Finkelstein outlines these different perceptions between the US and China:  
 
Figure 1.1: Chinese and U.S. Trust-Cooperation Perceptions38 
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As seen in the diagram, the US and China conceptualize the relationship between trust 
and security cooperation differently and hold different perceptions of which of these components 
must exist first to start the cycles of trust-cooperation expansion. China primarily views a degree 
of broader trust as a requirement to allow security cooperation on issues of mutual importance, 
while the US prioritizes security cooperation initiatives in contentious areas of the bilateral 
relationship as a means of building the trust that can in turn lead to broader cooperation and 
convergence of interests on issues. This dynamic of mismatched perceptions poses a significant 
obstacle for the emergence of both strategic trust and security cooperation on mutual security 
issues such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, since the different initial expectations and 
preferred starting points for beginning the trust-building process through increasing security 
cooperation inhibits taking the first steps for engagement.39 For North Korea, this has manifested 
as the present US-China political impasse and lack of a coordinated strategy to address the crisis 
despite both parties’ common interests in achieving denuclearization and stability, as explained 
in further detail in Chapter 2. Since security cooperation and strategic trust are thus shown to be 
mutually interdependent and will both be necessary in fostering the US-China engagement 
needed to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, these particular dynamics of trust in 
international relations and US-China relations offer significant insight into the fundamental 
importance of fostering a positive self-reinforcing trust-cooperation dynamic.  
 
1.5 Chapter Conclusions 
 
 To fully evaluate the role of the North Korean security crisis within US-China relations 
and understand the challenges and significance of security cooperation and trust-building on this 
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mutual security issue as the subsequent chapters of this thesis will address, it is first necessary to 
understand the historical context in which the North Korean nuclear program evolved and what 
the US and China’s roles and interests in the situation have been from a unilateral actor 
perspective. After outlining the current parameters of the nuclear crisis and the stalemate in US-
China collaboration on strategic approaches to the crisis, this chapter outlines the concepts of 
security cooperation and strategic trust and demonstrates the linkages between them as well as 
their relevance to perpetuating the current political impasse on North Korea. Given the focus of 
this thesis on the trust-cooperation dynamics as a key mode of US-China engagement on North 
Korea that stands to foster more substantial strategic coordination between the two countries in 
the future, the subsequent chapters will all utilize the framework of analysis established in this 
chapter as a basis upon which to examine the existing instances of US-China security 













Theoretical and Unilateral Challenges to US-China Security Cooperation 
 
 The Korean Peninsula issue is one of direct importance and great consequence to both the 
US and China, and the degree of responsiveness in North Korean nuclear developments to the 
evolving East Asian geopolitical context makes comprehensive analysis of the situation 
impossible without due emphasis on US-China dynamics. Fundamental conflicts of interest and 
different preferential outcomes between the two nations give impetus to the international 
community’s political and diplomatic impasse on the North Korean nuclear program, which has 
thus far permitted the North to expand its capabilities and escalate its aggression unchecked.  
These factors are not entirely intrinsically motivated but are driven by the same strategic 
distrust and the resulting competitive undercurrents sowing the deep-rooted tension in US-China 
bilateral relations.40 Given China’s status as a rising global power and the US' position as a 
dominant regional hegemon in China’s natural sphere of influence in East Asia, the difficulty 
and scarcity of security cooperation between the two is most suitably ascribed to the concepts of 
a “security dilemma” and great power transition in international relations theory. The presence of 
these dynamics not only predicts an increased likelihood for conflict–a causal relationship 
corroborated by historical observation–but also shapes the behavior of the involved states 
accordingly.41 Analyzing US-China security cooperation on North Korea through this conceptual 
lens thus provides an essential framework in which to understand each nation’s unilateral 
approach to North Korea as related to the larger picture of US-China competition in East Asia. 
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In this chapter, I first address the US and China’s respective national interests on the 
Korean Peninsula, shedding light on where and why their unilateral approaches diverge in 
practice and converge in theory. Through the first three sections, I reveal that these incentives 
and obstacles ultimately reflect prevailing strategic considerations on both sides as a function of 
the US-China geopolitical rivalry, making US-China security cooperation on North Korea 
fundamentally interconnected with the US-China bilateral relationship. Having established this 
crucial linkage, I then provide an overview of key theories and concepts of international relations 
and great power relations most relevant to US-China interactions on North Korea: the security 
dilemma, power transition theory, and the “Thucydides Trap.”  The fourth and fifth sections 
discuss each of these theoretical factors’ applicability and implications for of US-China security 
cooperation. Finally, the sixth section of this chapter provides a theoretical and practical 
assessment of the likelihood of US-China conflict and cooperation under these conditions, both 
in relation to North Korea and broader geopolitical circumstances. As the two schools of 
international relations theory with the greatest relevance to the US-China relationship as 
pertaining to the particular security and competition-based dynamics of the Korean Peninsula 
issue, institutionalism and realism are the primary theoretical perspectives through which I 
analyze the prospects of US-China security cooperation and trust-building in this context. 
 
2.1 China’s Unilateral Interests and Strategy Regarding North Korea 
 
 China’s national interests as they align with the North Korean nuclear crisis are fourfold: 
Beijing fundamentally wants to ensure Chinese border security, maintain domestic stability and 
economic growth, promote stability on the Korean Peninsula, seek denuclearization through 
engagement and gradual normalization of tensions, and preserve its strategic positioning within 
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East Asia in relation to the US. To this end, China’s positions as reflective of these interests have 
broadly been in favor of maintaining the stability of the Kim regime, opposing sanctions and 
other coercive measures advocated by the US and other international actors, and preserving its 
own economic and trade relations with North Korea. China’s policy towards North Korea, and 
towards the US in turn, has been demonstrated to conform to this set of strategic objectives.42  
China’s political leadership has been suspected of seeking to distance itself from the Kim 
regime43 in recent years since Kim Jong Un’s ascent to national leadership in 2011, and 
especially so following the increased North Korean nuclear activity in 2016 and 2017. However, 
the Chinese government still wants to avoid a collapse or overthrow of the North Korean regime 
because of the potential for domestic upheaval and humanitarian crises within China in the event 
of an inflow of millions of suddenly stateless North Korean refugees, which would have 
significant negative consequences for Chinese internal order and would place unprecedented 
strain on state resource distribution. Additionally, total regime collapse in North Korea could 
trigger endgame scenarios including regional instability, uncontrolled nuclear weapons at risk of 
seizure by rogue actors, or the necessity of an occupation led by Chinese or US-ROK forces in 
the interim while stabilizing the North Korean territory and rebuilding a unified Korean state.44 
These possible outcomes would impose significant political risk and financial or military burdens 
on China, making them all more strategically disadvantageous for China than maintaining the 
current predictable if imperfect status quo. However, Beijing recognizes that while the status quo 
currently represents the comparatively safer option of tentative conflict-free stability, it is 
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uncertain for how long the situation will remain so. China also perceives that the North Korean 
regime’s fragility is ultimately unsustainable, leading it to advocate an end goal of regime reform 
for North Korea rather than either regime collapse or the status quo.45 
It is primarily for this reason that China’s general policy on North Korea favors 
engagement over coercion as a primary policy tool, the opposite of the position advocated by the 
US. China has historically rejected UN sanctions on the grounds that economic coercion cannot 
meaningfully shrink the Kim regime’s resource or power base to force political concessions and 
are only hurtful to the North Korean people. Instead of seeking to overthrow the Kim regime, 
China states, a more viable denuclearization strategy would include helping North Korea to 
internally develop and integrate into the world.46 China maintains that such a solution would give 
North Korea other means for state survival besides clinging to nuclear weapons, and would 
likely result in a greater North Korean willingness to negotiate away its nuclear program in 
exchange for aid or other benefits.47 As a result of siding with the Kim regime and adopting this 
non-antagonistic stance, China also gains leverage through its strategic ambiguity regarding the 
full extent of its control and influence over North Korea,48 giving it a negotiating asset foregone 
by the more detached position and austere measures of the US. 
 China’s apparent support for the Kim regime also stems from the connections between 
domestic stability in North Korea and wider stability in East Asia. Regime collapse or domestic 
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instability within North Korea would inevitably propel a mass exodus of fleeing North Koreans 
across the Yalu River into China via the northern border; however, China’s economically 
underdeveloped northeastern regions are not equipped to handle the financial and social burden 
that these refugees would pose. Such social unsettlement could also cause destabilizing tensions 
within China itself, making the Chinese leadership eager to avoid any contingencies capable of 
disrupting China’s economic development and political status quo that may result from forceful 
action against the North Korean regime.49 Finally, this engagement policy has helped Chinese 
banks, companies, and manufacturers benefit economically from China’s decision to maintain 
trade with North Korea by exploiting loopholes in UN sanctions and other agreements designed 
to financially isolate North Korea. This is especially true of sanctions terms restricting imports of 
key strategic natural resources from the DPRK, such as coal and rare earth minerals, that fuel 
China’s economic growth. Although negligible, this exchange has had a slightly beneficial effect 
on the Chinese domestic economy at large, especially for the local economics of northeastern 
border cities where most trade with North Korea takes place. 
 China’s interests in North Korea in respect to bilateral relations with the United States are 
to defend its position within what China sees as its sphere of influence in East Asia. China 
remains suspicious of potential US attempts to use the North Korea crisis as an excuse to 
“contain” China militarily50: The Chinese leadership views previous US military engagements in 
East Asia in recent years through this hostile lens, including the diplomatic initiatives under 
President Barack Obama’s attempted “Asia Pivot” in 2013 and the 2016 decision to deploy the 
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Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) nuclear missile defense system in South 
Korea.51 In the former case, China resents a reinforcement of American military alliances with 
rival East Asian countries. In the latter case, it notes that the THAAD missile technology could 
also be used for offensive purposes beyond its stated defensive intent, which would allow US 
missiles to reach strategic targets on the Chinese mainland or to determine Chinese missile 
locations using THAAD’s powerful radar capabilities. 
 In this context, it emerges that China is uniquely able to use North Korea as a bargaining 
chip in its foreign policy, especially to counter perceived or threatened influence from the US. 
As North Korea’s only ally and a reliable if reluctant supplier of financial52 and material53 
assistance, China’s unique position of influence over the North Korean leadership allows it to 
use these ties to its advantage in international negotiations. Continuing strategically ambiguous 
relations with the DPRK therefore allows China to maintain this upper hand and position of 
power relative to other actors with an interest in North Korea, namely the US.54 Furthermore, 
maintaining non-hostile relations and engaging in food aid donations or trade with the North 
allows China to increase the isolated state’s economic and political dependence on China, 
ultimately strengthening China’s hand to punish or coerce should North Korea try to take action 
that would harm China’s interests later on.55 Seemingly contrary to these trends, Chinese 
cooperation against North Korea with the UN sanctions in 2016 from Resolution 2270 prompted 
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speculation that the Chinese leadership was tired of its partnership with North Korea and did not 
actually have as much influence over North Korea as it claimed.56 This conclusion too has been 
debated, with limited information outflows and vague Chinese policy statements providing little 
more than speculation by way of concrete evidence. However, the Chinese “dual strategy” of 
defending yet also condemning the Kim regime diminishes the degree of certainty that the two 
countries are in actuality drifting apart as much as many North Korea watchers may hope.57 Most 
significantly for China, a breakdown of order in North Korea–which any reduction of Chinese 
support would certainly accelerate–would invite a renewed or expanded US presence on the 
Korean Peninsula in order to keep the peace and uphold its treaty obligations to protect South 
Korea, in addition to pursuing its own interests in defending US military and economic 
installations in South Korea.58 Naturally, China would strongly oppose any increased presence of 
its rival hegemon on its doorstep, revealing the value of North Korea as a strategic geopolitical 
buffer for China against US influence.59 As a result, China’s actions can best be understood as 
primarily seeking to maintain the status quo, since it only reacts to North Korea when 
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2.2 The United States’ Unilateral Interests and Strategy Regarding North Korea 
 
 The United States’ unilateral interests on North Korea can be characterized by four main 
objectives: protecting its national security from nuclear threats, initiating regime change in North 
Korea, reassuring key at-risk regional allies of US defense commitments,61 and maintaining a 
strong strategic presence in East Asia. While American policies towards the Korean peninsula 
have featured a mix of engagement and coercion at different times since the years following the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991,62 the underlying motives in adopting these policies have 
remained constant throughout the past three decades despite different policy interpretations 
across different presidential administrations.  
Along with South Korea, the US is one of the two main targets of the North Korean 
regime’s aggressive rhetoric and threats. This role leads the US to view a nuclear North Korea as 
a potentially grave national security threat should the rogue state acquire the capabilities to 
miniaturize nuclear warheads and mount them on ICBMs capable of reaching US territories. 
Additionally, a completed North Korean nuclear weapons program could trigger further 
proliferation in a dangerous arms race throughout East Asia as Japan and South Korea – two 
regional allies threatened by Pyongyang’s offensive capabilities yet currently dependent on the 
US nuclear umbrella for security guarantees – would likely race to acquire their own nuclear 
weapons.63 This would threaten US economic and military interests in the region, undermine US 
efforts to establish a global norm and legal regime surrounding nonproliferation as embodied by 
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the NPT,64 and heighten China’s strategic distrust towards the US by arming its US-allied 
regional rivals.65 
Furthermore, the US maintains that long-term negotiation and engagement with North 
Korea should be based on a prerequisite of regime change and the Kim family’s removal from 
power without triggering the complete collapse of the North Korean state. Unlike China, the US 
includes human rights violations by the North Korean state as a stated concern in its policy 
formulation on the Korean Peninsula.66 The US Department of State has also allocated funds for 
projects supporting efforts to launch an “information campaign” among the North Korean people 
intended to prompt internal opposition to the regime that could potentially help achieve this 
objective, thus becoming part of US policy towards North Korea. 
 The United States’ bilateral relations with China fundamentally influence its interests in 
the Korean Peninsula, especially since the countries’ divergent strategic interests and objectives 
for the nuclear issue create discord and obstruct the formation of a coordinated policy approach 
despite their nominally shared goals of denuclearization and stabilization. The most readily 
evident example of bilateral dynamics concealed within the larger North Korean issue is that the 
United States continues its military presence in and collaboration with South Korea while China 
maintains its alliance with North Korea. The United States’ policy approach to North Korea for 
the better part of the past two decades, first under President George W. Bush and to a lesser 
extent under President Barack Obama, has been to utilize coercion, seeking to gain the 
international community’s support in economically and diplomatically isolating North Korea as 
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an attempt to reduce it into a position of weakness and force it to the negotiation table. The 
United Nations is the primary tool for the United States to symbolically rally the world’s nations 
behind sanctions to punish North Korea for transgressions with its nuclear program, a policy 
tactic that China most often notably opposes. Since China vetoes many Security Council 
resolutions against North Korea and is accused of only partially enforcing sanctions when it does 
allow resolutions to pass, the common rhetoric among American international relations and 
political circles is to blame China for obstructing meaningful action towards North Korea by not 
leveraging its full influence over North Korea.67 However, Chinese officials and scholars in turn 
hold largely critical views of the American approach, deriding US attempts at hard coercion and 
economic isolation as an ill-suited and ultimately ineffectual approach.68  
The persistence of these divergent and in many ways opposite views on the Korean 
Peninsula between China and the US, despite their nominal common objectives, indicates the 
need for careful consideration of the other party’s strategic calculations for any meaningful 
action on the issue to take place. In turn, moving the US and China towards a more coordinated 
strategy on North Korea will require a level of greater mutual understanding and communication, 
which could be facilitated by engagement in dialogue and other trust-building cooperative 
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2.3 The US and China’s Mutual Interests Regarding North Korea 
 
Despite their different interests as related to their unique national conditions and security 
concerns, the US and China’s core interests for North Korea do align around their shared goals 
of ensuring a stable and denuclearized Korean Peninsula, giving both nations a common vision 
for the future outcome of the nuclear dilemma. However, the US is driven to pursue these stances 
by different national interests than those propelling China towards these goals, ultimately 
resulting in a lack of consensus over how exactly the states should jointly work towards bringing 
about a nuclear-free North Korea. 
As indicated in the preceding sections, stability in East Asia is a concern for both parties: 
in the case of a North Korean regime collapse or elite faction coup, China would be reluctant to 
care for refugees or become involved itself to stabilize a potential post-regime power vacuum, 
while the US would face threats of nuclear proliferation or could be forced to mobilize its 
military forces in East Asia on its treaty allies’ behalf.69 Denuclearization, however, is the 
ultimate goal of both parties regarding North Korea, since both nations view as the essential key 
to long-term stability. Conversely, non-action on the Korean Peninsula and by default allowing 
North Korea to advance its nuclear program runs counter to these core interests for both parties. 
In light of these considerations, why are the US and China not consistently incentivized to forego 
narrow unilateral concerns in pursuit of cooperation towards larger and more strategically 
consequential shared goals? 
China and the US are independently motivated by concerns specific to their respective 
national contexts as part of their individual reasoning for holding stability and denuclearization 
as key priorities on the North Korean nuclear issue. However, their divergent individual interests 
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in how these objectives should be achieved – including different views on the future of the Kim 
regime and the North Korean state as a whole – are indicative of an underlying conflict of 
different strategic preferences, which are prompted by the corresponding disconnects and 
competition in the broader US-China relationship. The exclusive unilateral and shared mutual 
interests of the US and China regarding the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis as discussed so far in 
this thesis are summarized in the following diagram:  
 
         
   Figure 2.1: Unilateral and Mutual Interests of the US and China  




While the first three factors listed in each unilateral column of the diagram are relevant 
only in a unilateral context, the fourth set of considerations – “counter US influence” for China 
and “strategic Asia presence” for the US – show two directly conflicting incentives that are 
relevant only in the context of competition with the other party. In the sense that all other 
unilateral interests listed for each actor can be seen as at least in part a function of their 
overarching geostrategic objective, it thus emerges that the distrust evident in the US and 
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China’s assumptions of each other’s political motives vis-à-vis the other is the primary factor 
driving the US and China’s divergent interests and strategies on the Korean Peninsula.70 Since 
the US-China impasse over the North Korean nuclear crisis is emblematic of the larger 
suspicions in US-China relations as conceptualized by the key concepts of international relations 
theory enumerated in the remaining sections of Chapter 2, enhancing trust through security 
cooperation on a mutual issue like North Korea as established in Section 1.4 thus seems a potent 
prescription to gradually realign the two nations’ thinking towards cooperation and action. 
 
2.4 The US-China Security Dilemma and the Korean Peninsula 
 
 To evaluate why US-China security cooperation on North Korea does not occur as often 
as their mutual objectives for the Korean Peninsula might suggest, it is essential to examine how 
the fundamental distrust between the US and China provides the conditions for a security 
dilemma dynamic to emerge in East Asia, which shifts how both states perceive one another 
strategically.  A central concept in the study of international relations, the security dilemma was 
originally coined by John Herz and has been extensively analyzed and reassessed for its 
applicability in a variety of contexts. The root of the problem as is commonly identified by Herz 
and others is that in an anarchic system of sovereign states who cannot gauge each other’s 
intentions with absolute certainty and who are beholden to no higher global governing power 
capable of mediating affairs, sharing information, preventing conflict, or guaranteeing security, 
states are forced to look out for their own security and subsequently seek to acquire more power 
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each time a rival actor in the system does.71 72 In this world order, the security dilemma dictates 
that even though cooperation and disarmament are the ideal outcomes for all parties, none can 
trust the others or discern whether military preparations are intended as defensive rather than 
offensive measures,73 leading actors to feel threatened and develop their own arms to counteract 
any possible security threat from the other. These developments could then in turn pose a 
security threat to the original actor, which might want to continue further developing its military 
as well in response. This escalating spiral of threatening perceptions, militarizing responses, and 
barriers to cooperation not only creates ample room for conflicts to occur,74 but can also extend 
beyond just the notion of military security to include comprehensive political, social, and 
economic aspects of security as well, demonstrating the abundance of insecurity inherent in the 
international system.75 
 The security dilemma is a particularly relevant analytical tool for understanding US-
China relations because in big-power relations where both parties are of comparable military or 
weapons capability, the stakes are much higher and the scale is larger. These circumstances make 
the state actors involved less likely to take risks in compromising their own security by allowing 
their counterpart to build its strength unchecked. The same situation of the inability to discern 
defensive from offensive capabilities applies once again in regard to the question of nuclear 
sovereignty and the dual-use capabilities of nuclear weapons for deterrence or offense. When 
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two nations consider each other real or potential rivals–as the US and China do–the driving 
factor for their actions is fear of the other party.76 As a result, they are more sensitive to 
responding to actions taken by the other party in kind with a “tit-for-tat” exchange of 
corresponding reactions, which can escalate the situation quickly and heighten tensions while 
reducing the actors’ willingness to pursue other routes to compromise or communicate.  
This “spiral model,” a key representation of state interaction under the security dilemma, 
describes the process whereby initially small measures prompt exponentially more serious 
actions from both sides in future rounds of strategic interaction. The model is self-reinforcing 
and can be used to predict both great power competition in cases where the actors threaten each 
other under a security dilemma (an “escalation spiral” or “conflict spiral”)77 and great power 
cooperation in cases where the actors accommodate each other instead (a “cooperation spiral”).78 
Since the principle of “tit-for-tat” exchanges remains the core dynamic in both context-based 
interpretations, the determining factor for which direction the spiral moves in – towards conflict 
or cooperation – depends on whether the initial actions are fueled by suspicion and retaliation or 
trust and engagement. In cases where trust is absent, the states’ actions and perceptions are more 
likely to be inherently rivalrous in nature rather than inclined towards cooperation, leading 
towards situations that further entrench and exacerbate the underlying security dilemma between 
the two actors.79 The opposite, then, is true of states that are able to show cooperative and 
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trusting intent towards each other, even in the security dilemma conditions: 80 after pursuing 
initial actions to reassure their counterpart through small-scale cooperation, the parties are more 
and more likely to trust their partner and respond to that cooperation reciprocally, which can in 
turn improve trust to prompt further security cooperation down the line.  
Thus, the dual nature of the spiral model emphasizes the role of trust as the main 
determinant of cooperation or conflict under security dilemma conditions.81 Since trust is a 
fundamental determinant of a state’s perceived security in relation to other states in the 
international system, it is relevant to analyze the intersection of trust and cooperation on security 
issues from the security-focused international relations theory of realism. Realism maintains that 
states are ultimately preoccupied with guaranteeing their own security and thus their survival in 
the international system, and to this end they seek to maximize their security to the greatest 
extent possible. However, this search for security can be focused either outwards, towards 
seeking to minimize other states’ relative or absolute power and influence, or inwards, involving 
maximizing a state’s own strength.82 These two conceptions of realism – aptly labeled offensive 
and defensive realism – also have different predictions for cooperation under the security 
dilemma. For offensive realists, war is the rational and inevitable way for great powers to ensure 
that no other nation develops the capacity to overtake them when they cannot guarantee their 
rivals’ benign intentions. For defensive realists, however, the security dilemma itself enables 
genuine interstate cooperation between states so long as they are faced with a common threat, 
which would prompt defensive security-seeking states to band together to hedge against the 
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threat.83 This distinction reveals the critical importance of the applicability of trust as a 
foundation for these interactions through spirals. Where trust is present, these conditions imply, 
positive spirals fostering engagement approaches and a deeper level of security cooperation that 
reinforce mutual trust in return are more likely to prevail. However, where trust is absent, the 
opposite is true, and the pursuit of one-sided interests to hedge against the other party as a 
perceived threat is more likely to erode trust while prompting a greater risk of escalating these 
tensions into conflict due to the growing distrust throughout the phases of the escalation spiral.  
Therefore, when interpreting the spiral model’s implications for security cooperation in a 
security dilemma situation like that of the US and China’s interactions on the Korean Peninsula 
nuclear crisis, it is critical to account for the level of either pre-existing trust to organically 
prompt cooperation or the level to which the leaders of each state are willing to risk cooperation 
as a means of overcoming distrust with the purpose of avoiding conflict.  
This thesis argues that although US-China security cooperation has demonstrated an 
increasing pattern of prompting further cooperation in a manner fitting a cooperation spiral, the 
level of security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula overall remains limited, thus indicating an 
underlying sense of distrust in their bilateral relationship that can be gradually improved by trust-
building efforts resulting from this repeated cooperation. The applications of these dynamics in 
relation to the North Korean nuclear crisis will be further explored in Chapter 3 through case 
studies of notable bilateral cooperation towards the issue and in Chapter 4 through an exploration 
of patterns of expanding security cooperation as a result of these instances from Chapter 3, thus 
demonstrating the self-reinforcing nature of the cooperation spiral in promoting trust-building 
and further cooperation through each round of security cooperation.  
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2.5 Theories of Power Transition and Conflict 
 
The relative positions and power of the US and China in 21st Century world politics are 
the lens through which most predictions for future US-China interaction assess the prospects of 
bilateral security cooperation. America, as the dominant global hegemon in the Post-World War 
II international system and the sole remaining superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, is currently stronger and more influential than China, a nation that only began its 
modernization process in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening” (改革开放) 
policy. However, China is now assuming a greater role and importance within the contemporary 
world order through its rapidly growing political, economic, and military power, leading some to 
speculate that a rising China could overtake a receding America to assume its superpower status 
at some point in the near future. Scholars, diplomats, and policymakers on both sides fear that 
this strategic competition between China and the US could escalate tensions between the two 
wary nations to the point of conflict.84 85 They argue that this possibility is also distinctly 
acknowledged by both sides and is centrally considered in formulating policies of mutual 
hedging towards the other to further their own interests.86 
According to prevailing theories of international relations, the moment of transition 
between a rising power and an established superpower would mark a pivotal tipping point in the 
balance of world power whose volatility can be explained by Power Transition Theory, first 
pioneered by Kenneth Organski.87 The theory states that a conflict of some type is more likely to 
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occur at the time when the rising power is about to surpass the established power. While rising 
powers inherently want to keep rising and assume the role of a regional or global hegemon, 
Organski argues, the current hegemons must decide whether to peacefully accommodate the new 
powers within the same sphere of influence or instead try to prevent the usurper from eclipsing 
its current rule. Since the hegemonic role objectively affords valuable strategic and economic 
benefits, along with a greater persuasive or coercive advantage over the rest of the world that 
allows a hegemonic actor to pursue its agendas and interests more freely, there are great 
incentives for the hegemon to attempt to hold onto its advantageous position and prevent the 
other nation from overtaking it. 
In the context of great power relations, this type of power transition situation with a 
potential to spark conflict between superpower nations is known as a “Thucydides Trap”. The 
term was originally coined in 2012 by American political scientist Graham Allison as a reference 
to Greek historian Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, which describes a 5th Century 
regional conflict in Ancient Greece where Sparta, the established power, felt threatened by the 
rising power of its rival neighboring state, Athens.88 The resulting fear and tensions escalated 
exponentially in a manner conforming to the predictions of the spiral model conditions favoring 
competition, ultimately prompting Sparta to pre-emptively attack Athens in an attempt to prevent 
Athens from overtaking Sparta and to reassert unequivocal dominance within its perceived 
sphere of influence.89 
This theory could apply to potential conflict between the US and China in any sphere in 
which they hold fundamentally incompatible interests and objectives, which are criteria that 
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characterize the tense East Asian security environment surrounding the North Korean nuclear 
crisis particularly well. A historical case analysis by Allison found that 12 out of the last 16 cases 
of major rising power-ruling power rivalries that threatened shifts in the worldwide balance of 
power did result in armed conflict. 90 This finding indicates that the tensions and conflict 
incentivized by Power Transition Theory do in a majority of cases hold true, fueling abundant 
pessimism that the US and China will achieve the same fate.  
However, there are still notable exceptions, including the peaceful shift of global 
hegemony from Great Britain to the United States from 1865-1945 amidst gradual global 
systemic shifts including decolonization and the establishment of the US-led post-WWII liberal 
international order.91 Many of the same institutional and structural circumstances that allowed 
for this smooth transition, such as linkages within and integration into the international economic 
and political system, are still present in the current US-China context, as are favorable 
geopolitical and economic factors that make this situation even less readily comparable to the 
rough power transitions predicted by the Thucydides Trap theory alone. Therefore, although 
sensationalized conflict scenarios may seem increasingly likely in the current tense 
circumstances, the threat of a US-China war is in fact less salient than often imagined, especially 
since both sides demonstrate a capability to de-escalate the potential causes and a rational desire 
to avoid the potential consequences. 
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2.6 Escaping the Thucydides Trap: Avoiding Conflict and Improving Trust through  
      Cooperation 
 
The majority of American and Chinese scholars specializing in US-China relations 
ascribe to the optimistic view that China and the US will be able to avoid a war at the point of 
power transition: out of 131 experts surveyed, 70.99% said that a US-China war in the next 20 
years was “not likely” or “absolutely no,” 17.56% said that it was “hard to say,” and only 
11.45% said that conflict was “likely” with none responding “absolutely yes.”92 When asked to 
rate the overall change in US-China relations in the next 5 years, however, only 10.69% of those 
experts said that bilateral relations would “get better,” while 26.72% said they would “get 
worse,” another 29.01% said it was “hard to say,” and 33.59% predicted “no change.”93 These 
results indicate that while experts are pessimistic about tensions worsening between the US and 
China in the coming years, they do not think that it will ultimately result in conflict, thus 
demonstrating their belief in the US-China relationship as a power shift able to evade the 
Thucydides Trap.  
According to scholars and international observers, there are many compelling reasons 
why the US and China will more than likely be able to counter the tide of history and avoid full-
scale war. The Thucydides Trap notion when applied to the US-China context is itself 
anachronistic, not fully accounting for the dynamics of today’s globalized and multilayered 
international system including economic interdependence94 and embeddedness in multilateral 
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institutions95 that have worked to decrease the occurrence of interstate wars since World War II. 
Even with the most recent conflict at a point of great power transition occurring between Great 
Britain and Germany at the start of World War I in 1914,96 the abundant international 
institutions, partnerships and organizations established since then have provided unprecedented 
avenues to resolve disputes between nations in alternative forums to the theater of war. This line 
of reasoning, aptly labeled Institutionalist Theory, is often held in opposition to the power 
transition theory as the primary means of prediction for managing relations and conflict 
mitigation between great powers.97 This greater interconnectedness not only creates more 
opportunities for communication but also elevates the potential of sanctions, diplomacy, and 
other non-military tools to achieve policy goals against states with equal effectiveness and lower 
costs than war. The US and China have indeed followed the pattern of engagement with 
increasing frequency when operating within this context: the two nations established the bilateral 
Security and Economic Dialogue annual meetings in 2009 to create direct high-level channels 
between their governments, mirrored by recent collaboration in the United Nations and other 
multilateral forums on issues of common interest such as North Korea. While these 
developments do show a conscious joint effort from the US and China towards coordination and 
interchange, the institutionalist theory framework on conflict mitigation still leaves ample room 
for destabilizing suspicions to take root or for fatal miscalculations to occur on either side. 
The second fundamental difference between historical Thucydides Trap conflicts and the 
present US-China situation is that the US and China have different incentives, capabilities, 
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conditions, and considerations that make war unthinkable from a cost-benefit analysis 
standpoint. These factors are most commonly emphasized in the economic sphere.98 Currently, 
China and America are each other’s largest and second-largest trading partners. China holds 
trillions of US foreign debt, and US companies are heavily invested in China. This exceptional 
economic interconnectedness and the centrality of each nation to the growth and stability of the 
other’s economy would greatly increase the short- and long-term costs of a conflict that cuts 
those ties, making US-China war not only tougher to fight but harder to justify. The vested 
financial interests in maintaining current bilateral ties also create greater domestic opposition to 
wars that would harm citizens’ and companies’ well-being, making such an outcome too 
politically inviable to be likely. Ultimately the degree of interdependence, economic and 
otherwise, between China and the US will make them more inclined to favor conciliatory 
approaches to their bilateral relations, since outright confrontation would be devastating for both 
and in the interest of neither.99 These conclusions fit the characterizations of US-China relations 
prescribed by both liberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on security from interstate linkages 
within formal organizations and mechanisms, and defensive realism, with its emphasis on 
security from comparative power advantages. 
While strong economic ties contribute to the US and China’s active aversion to war, the 
school of realism indicates that it is more so the geopolitical context that strongly diminishes 
incentives to push war into the realm of plausible consideration for either side. As two 
geographically large nations separated across a long distance over the Pacific, neither the US nor 
China poses an immediate military threat to the other’s mainland territorial integrity. Unlike the 
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smaller European states in closer proximity to rivals during history’s previous power transition 
periods,100 the US and China thus have a more credible guarantee of their existential security. 
From the perspective of defensive realism – which, unlike offensive realism, argues that 
dominant states in the global system are driven by power concerns to primarily defend their 
dominant role rather than actively opposing potential rivals101 – this degree of guaranteed 
security makes conflict less likely, thus making tensions easier to overcome and trust easier to 
build in a lower-stakes security environment.102 Again due to the geopolitical situation of China 
and the US, offensive contingencies such as a Sino-American war could not be easily won by 
conventional military means, increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war with other 
tactical options limited. The US and China both possess enough nuclear weapons to decimate the 
other; as with the Cold War logic of “Mutually Assured Destruction” and deterrence as 
peacekeeping paradigms, the US and China will ultimately continue seeking to avoid national 
obliteration by defusing flashpoints for conflict, knowing the risks are too great and the rewards 
too meager for war to be worthwhile.  
While many of the unique circumstances surrounding the US-China relationship at this 
time of power transition are thus argued to be more conflict-mitigating than conflict-provoking 
as the Thucydides Trap might suggest, a peaceful scenario of China’s rise is anything but 
assured. The possibility of existing and emerging tensions irrevocably escalating into war cannot 
be prematurely discounted, and policymakers in both nations do continue to incorporate an 
element of strategic hedging against the other party with preparation for conflict contingencies in 
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mind.103 However, both nations’ leaders have also acknowledged a desire to avoid such scenarios 
and have stated their respective intents to build a more cooperative bilateral relationship. This is 
envisioned by Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “new type of great power relations”  (新型大国
关系),104 of which the core idea is that greater US-China cooperation will be crucial in the two 
nations’ efforts to escape the Thucydides Trap and reduce the security dilemma in which they 
currently operate in East Asia.  
In connection with the theoretical framework presented in the preceding sections, the 
presence of dynamics that heighten US-China tension and suspicion (security dilemmas, power 
transition, and the Thucydides Trap) make security cooperation on critical issues of mutual 
interest like the Korean Peninsula all the more desirable. Additionally, since both sides openly 
recognize the urgent need to avoid the disastrous consequences of lingering distrust as predicted 
by these models and have stated their willingness to cooperate towards this end, the US and 
China seem to have indicated they are more likely to take action accordingly to foster trust, 
which lays the psychological groundwork enabling security cooperation and in turn 
strengthening the bilateral relationship over time through continued rounds of deeper and more 
frequent trust-building security cooperation. Therefore, although great power conflict may 
ultimately be unlikely for the US and China from institutionalist and realist perspectives, it is up 
to the two nations themselves to make engagement efforts to ensure that a spiral of greater 
cooperation rather than escalation prevails in East Asia. 
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The North Korean security crisis thus emerges as one arena in which bilateral policy 
coordination is simultaneously the most necessary and the most difficult due to the sensitivity 
and sanctity of matters concerning national security. However, even where there is apparent 
surface-level cooperation in US-China engagement on North Korea, the underlying tensions and 
conflicts of interest still inhibit the emergence of the higher-level trust needed to facilitate 
deeper-level cooperation when opposing strategic interests are at stake on the Peninsula. These 
circumstances make bilateral efforts towards engagement rather than isolation between both 
China and the US on security issues in the early stages of strategic interaction – an inclination so 
far indicated by both sides – the most essential factor for defusing conflict, rather than passively 
hoping that advantageous geopolitical and institutional factors can safely steer the rocky bilateral 
relationship into a conflict-free future.   
 
2.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 
Without full evaluation and understanding of how the tensions in the US-China bilateral 
relationship shape each state’s foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula and give rise to the 
longstanding political stalemate over North Korea’s nuclear program, we will be left with an 
incomplete understanding of one of the most dangerous and complex international security issues 
of the 21st Century. This chapter primarily elaborates on the links between US-China relations 
and the nuclear insecurity surrounding North Korea to demonstrate that these two factors’ deep 
interconnectedness necessitates their close association in conceptual and policy approaches to the 
North Korean nuclear threat. In doing so, it demonstrates that the protracted Korean Peninsula 
issue within US-China relations should be understood as ultimately emblematic of the 
fundamental distrust between the US and China. This conclusion arises from the prevalence of 
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US-China distrust in creating theoretical and practical obstacles in the crisis, since this 
characteristic perpetuates the security dilemma and power transition dynamics that cause 
misalignment of US and Chinese strategic interests on North Korea. Although the US and China 
do also hold incentives for collaboration in this area – namely their shared goals of 
denuclearization and stability along with their stated aim of mitigating the likelihood of a great 
power conflict between them – the Korean Peninsula poses a paradoxical challenge in that the 
salience of US-China distrust in perpetuating the crisis prompts a greater need for US-China 
cooperation to resolve this mutual threat yet also makes this cooperation inherently more 
difficult. The implications of this strategic distrust for the feasibility, efficacy, and importance of 















Chapter 3  
US-China Security Cooperation in Practice: Engagement on North 
Korea 
 
Having established the centrality of US-China relations to the North Korean nuclear issue 
and identified the resulting theoretical and political challenges to bilateral cooperation, it 
becomes imperative to understand how US-China security cooperation could be initiated and 
sustained in this context to advance towards a resolution of the Korean Peninsula security crisis. 
Although the objectives of this security cooperation are determined by the parameters of the 
working definition outlined in Chapter 1, the form and feasibility of the ideal level of US-China 
engagement raise new questions: Under what circumstances might bilateral security cooperation 
on North Korea occur? What would such engagement look like in practice? What would be the 
conditions for successfully prompting repeated iterations of cooperation? Finally, if the North 
Korean issue is so polarized anyway, with American and Chinese interests directly at odds, then 
is deeper cooperation on such an important security matter even possible?  
These questions can ultimately be answered with increasing certainty because US-China 
security cooperation on North Korea is not unprecedented. The largest-scale official dialogues on 
the situation were the Six-Party Talks (6PT) from 2003-2007, which, although not the first joint 
meeting on the subject, were notable for the earliest tangible emergence of patterns of 
coordination and compromise between the US and China regarding the Korean Peninsula. A 
decade later into the ongoing crisis, the newest round of United Nations sanctions against North 
Korea in 2016 not only demonstrates the lasting legacy of incremental steps towards cooperation 
but also an unprecedented convergence of US and Chinese efforts to intensify diplomatic 
pressure on Pyongyang. Selecting these two instances of US-China cooperation as the most 
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recent and significant examples within the history of US-China interaction and strategic policy 
formation in regard to each other on the North Korea issue – one the first historical instance of 
formal diplomatic engagement and high-level cooperation on the security dimensions of the 
Korean Peninsula conundrum, the other at the forefront of contemporary developments in the 
ongoing crisis – creates a framework for comparative analysis enabling an assessment of the 
impacts of security cooperation on the development of the Korean Peninsula security crisis. 
This chapter begins by conceptualizing security cooperation as applied to US-China 
engagement on North Korea, proposing that the spiral model for reciprocal cooperation is both 
the most realistic and likely the most effective form. The chapter then examines two successful 
examples of US-China cooperation on North Korea – the Six Party Talks and the 2016 UN 
sanctions – as selected case studies, focusing on the most groundbreaking instances of further 
multilateral cooperation that were directly prompted by or influenced by the cases. In doing so, I 
determine that US-China cooperation on North Korea does prove successful in improving the 
frequency and depth of future security cooperation. Broader concurrent patterns of unrelated US-
China collaboration on North Korea and increasing cooperation on parallel security issues are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1 The Spiral Model for Cooperation 
 
The spiral model for cooperation, or a “cooperation spiral,” is the model for improving 
coordination between key actors that is most suited to specifically assess security issues 
otherwise stuck in political inertia. Goldstein defines the basic premise as a scenario where “trust 
and confidence are built over time through incremental and reciprocal steps that gradually lead to 
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larger and more significant compromises.” 105  These small steps may not represent significant 
policy shifts or concessions at first, but are nonetheless important to develop trust and 
cooperative mechanisms between actors in the hope of signaling both sides’ trustworthiness as a 
partner for future joint efforts. The cooperation spiral was conceived as the equal and opposite 
foil to an “escalation spiral,” a more common construct in international relations scholarship. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2 in relation to the risk of such dynamics arising in the face of 
security dilemmas as with contemporary US-China relations, the escalation spiral model depicts 
rising tensions in security dilemma situations with the same tit-for-tat retaliation tactics as those 
observed in the cooperation spiral, except moving negatively towards militarization and 
aggression rather than positively towards engagement and détente.106 If this escalation is the 
vehicle by which a conflict would most likely be started, the reasoning goes, then mutual 
engagement could have the opposite effect if operating under the same principles and patterns. In 
context, this illustrates that US-China cooperation is possible beginning with US engagement 
and security guarantees for North Korea to be matched by reciprocal Chinese concessions over 
each of five rounds, resulting eventually in successful denuclearization of North Korea.107 In the 
diagram below, Goldstein illustrates this concept as applied to US-China relations on North 
Korea by presenting one possible series of theoretical steps that each side could take to build the 
missing bilateral trust over repeat interactions as needed to move towards the US and China’s 
common goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula:  
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          Figure 3.1: Example US-China Cooperation Spiral  
                           on the Korean Peninsula108 
 The exact course of action proposed by Goldstein’s simplified model includes significant 
security concessions that run counter to core US and Chinese interests as early as the second 
round of interaction, ultimately making such a scenario seem far-fetched and theoretically 
idealized rather than realistic given the strained tensions in China-US relations at present. 
However, his conceptualization of a cooperation spiral in practice on the North Korean nuclear 
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dilemma nonetheless illustrates in greater clarity how initial low-stakes cooperative efforts can 
prompt reciprocal cooperation in a cycle that is exponentially expanding or deepening the level 
of security cooperation, fueled by a gradual increase in the strategic significance and trust-
building benefits of policy concessions through collaboration between two or more parties with 
initially divergent stances and interests at stake. 
No matter the model or expected form of interaction, this common theme of a heightened 
level of engagement is expected to continue and expand in the future, thus mitigating the 
likelihood of conflict according to the spiral model theoretical framework. The need for both 
China and the US to play central roles in any efforts to address the Korean Peninsula security 
dilemma has prompted the nations to preemptively recognize the importance of planning for 
long-term contingencies and building an understanding of each other’s positions in the 
present.109 Several notable instances of such collaboration have resulted between the two nations, 
namely the Six-Party Talks from 2003-2007 and the latest round of United Nations Security 
Council sanctions against North Korea in 2016. These high-profile instances of productive US-
China cooperation towards North Korea are often touted as bright spots within an otherwise 
unsynchronized series of widely criticized failures by the US and China to overcome their 
bilateral differences on the issue. By comparison, as indicated in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis, the gradually improving frequency and level of cooperation between the US and China in 
responding to North Korea110 and its positive implications for bilateral trust-building according 
to the cooperation model are more often sidelined by the scholarly literature, as is the 
corresponding positive effect of successful collaboration on North Korea prompting greater US-
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China collaboration efforts on other security issues. The following sections will examine these 
two instances of security cooperation on North Korea first in terms of the circumstances that 
allowed for the US and China to pursue collaborative engagement, and then with an eye towards 
the additional mutual cooperation efforts undertaken after each event. 
 
3.2 Case Study 1: The Six-Party Talks, 2003-2007 
 
Circumstances and Outcome 
The Six-Party Talks (6PT) marked a concession from the US with a reversal of 
Washington’s former policy of non-engagement with North Korea. Delegations from the 
participating nations of the US, China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan and Russia convened in 
Beijing on August 27, 2003 to begin a series of six rounds of talks that ran until their indefinite 
suspension in June 2007. The talks were prompted by an international crisis following North 
Korea’s revelation during meetings with the US in 2002 that it was pursuing a secret nuclear 
weapons program in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which North Korea 
then dropped out of in 2003. At that point, North Korea itself demanded bilateral talks with the 
US in the hopes that such an arrangement would prove advantageous, offering a chance to 
extract legitimacy-enhancing concessions from the US more easily without China’s presence 
while also addressing its perceived nemesis directly and reducing reliance on China as a 
mediator in the affair.  However, the US continued to resist engagement altogether until North 
Korea first acquiesced to doing so via multilateral rather than bilateral platforms in the Six-Party 
Talks. This setting proved favorable because it afforded the US additional leverage against North 
Korea and a numerical counterbalance to China through the inclusion of staunch US allies in 
South Korea and Japan, which China unwillingly but eventually conceded to. 
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Although the very existence of the Six-Party Talks demonstrated an unprecedented level 
of initiative and attempt at collaboration between China and the US to make progress on the 
nuclear issue, coupled with an increasing number of parallel forums and attempts at negotiating 
through their differences outside of the formal talks, the talks ultimately failed to secure 
significant concessions from North Korea. There were only three formal international 
agreements to emerge from the Talks with significance for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: 
the “Statement of Principles” in September 2005, the “Initial Actions of the Implementation of 
the Joint Statement” in February 2007, and the “Agreement on Second Phase Actions” in 
October 2007.111 The 2005 Joint Statement was notable in that the DPRK promised to abandon 
its nuclear weapons and nuclear development programs in return for US pledges of 
nonaggressive intent towards it, yet the remainder of the document’s six points simply echoed 
previous points of agreement among the parties and pledged to take action via “coordinated steps 
to implement the aforementioned consensus” at a future date.112 However, the two subsequent 
expansions on the agreement did little to prompt action on these promises. Once again, the Six-
Party Talks came to exemplify the difficulties in negotiating across apparently insurmountable 
disparities between the regional actors’ common objective of a non-nuclear North Korea and 
their different ideas of how to proceed towards this common goal, since each actor’s respective 
policies on North Korea were inevitably shaped by their own unique national and geopolitical 
interests.113 Beijing’s and Washington’s actions in the Six-Party Talks were also guided by their 
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inherently conflicting respective national interests in acquiring a position of global leadership 
and maintaining hegemony.114 The parties generally maintained their positions throughout and 
never committed to any official statements beyond vague agreed points, and this 
uncooperativeness was among the reasons for the failure of the Six Party Talks to produce results 
and place limitation on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.115 
Effects on Continued Cooperation 
However, despite the apparent lack of surface-level success, the Six-Party Talks have 
indeed provided the needed impetus for increased US-China collaboration. Following the failure 
of the Six-Party Talks and North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
in 2003, the United Nations Security Council was prompted to implement economic sanctions 
targeting North Korea’s nuclear program in 2006 with Resolution 1695, the first such sanctions 
regime to successfully pass with the absence of a Chinese veto.116 This cooperation represented a 
compromise on behalf of all parties despite different end goals and viewpoints, a feat that has not 
since been repeated to the same extent amid more static diplomatic efforts towards North Korea.  
Improved coordination outside of the dialogue forums also helped the US and China 
reach this moment of significant policy collaboration: during the Six Party Talks, there was a 
notable increase in direct phone communication between US President Bush and Chinese 
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President Hu to discuss responses to North Korea.117 Both sides also began to send emissaries for 
direct bilateral consultations with the other nation’s leadership more frequently, with the Chinese 
in particular utilizing “shuttle diplomacy” throughout the early crisis months of 2003 to send 
envoys from its Foreign Ministry back and forth between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Washington, 
where they advocated for dialogue and worked to establish a mutually-agreeable platform for the 
parties to meet in talks that year.118 The two governments’ respective foreign affairs organs also 
went to new lengths to communicate at a lower level: the Chinese foreign minister and US 
Secretary of State held an unprecedented 13 meetings and 32 phone conversations about North 
Korea during the 6PT period from October 2002 to February 2007, in addition to frequent 
consultative meetings between the heads of the US and Chinese delegations to the Talks.119 
These factors proved crucial in the ability of China and the US to coordinate effectively during 
the 6PT.  
The US negotiation team in attendance at the Six-Party Talks indicated that its members 
perceived a boost to US-China relations as a whole from the positive engagement and 
collaboration efforts during the talks, despite the Talks’ nominal failure with only one 
agreement, two subsequent statements, and no tangible policy changes produced.120 These 
improvements in communication and willingness to compromise contributed significantly to the 
success of US-China cooperation, both in the immediate context of the Six-Party Talks along 
with observable long-term increases in more intensive bilateral engagement over the 2004-2008 
                                                             
117. Glaser and Wang, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” 112. 
 
118. Kyung-Ae Park, “North Korea in 2003: Pendulum Swing Between Crisis and Diplomacy,” Asian 
Survey 44, no. 1 (2004): 142. 
 
119.  Glaser and Wang, “China-U.S. Partnership,” 176. 
 
120. Ibid., 116. 
60 
 
period.121 Collaborating in a dialogue setting allowed both sides to test and adjust policies in 
relation to the other party, as the US eventually did during the 6PT talks by softening on an 
original policy of no unilateral engagement with North Korea that until then had stalled 
negotiations. The dialogue on security issues also provided a channel of contact to improve 
communication and gain information about the other sides’ preferences and objectives that can 
then inform future cooperative efforts, a factor often touted as the key to trust-building between 
national leaders and policymakers even beyond the 6PT.122 Although the lack of trust between 
the parties was noted by observers as a key reason for the failure of the 6PT to produce more 
concrete action than just the three official statements published over the forum’s four years of 
activity, this very engagement on the North Korean nuclear issue by virtue of participating in the 
6PT itself was nonetheless an important step towards facilitating a security environment more 
conducive to deepening the US-China cooperation spiral set into motion on the Korean 
Peninsula. In accordance with the trust-cooperation linkage prescribed by this model, therefore, 
the 6PT was thus an important step towards beginning to build the essential trust that the US and 
China still lack.   
For these reasons, the 6PT was in fact a valuable experience for both the US and China in 
improving the likelihood of successful cooperation in future rounds of engagement on North 
Korea, as well as making this very engagement more likely to occur.123 Therefore, the fact that 
the 6PT was the first instance of visible US-China cooperation to engage North Korea and 
attempt to persuade it to denuclearize was the main significance of the Talks. While the 6PT 
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talks were inherently valuable in attempting security cooperation for the first time, the 
longstanding impact of this multilateral engagement was establishing a basis for strategic 
interactions with the potential to instill a greater level of trust in both parties, due ability of such 
formal engagement to foster a higher degree of mutual understanding of each party’s intentions, 
interests, and concerns for the Korean Peninsula. This level of heightened cooperation while 
addressing a crisis in the North Korean case thus helped lay the groundwork for future US-China 
engagement efforts on the issue, including bilateral nonproliferation talks in February 2016 and 
meetings between the American and Chinese presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping on the 
sidelines of conferences such as the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit on March 31, 2016.  
 
3.3 Case Study 2: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 Sanctions, 2016 
 
Circumstances and Outcome 
The US-China impasse over North Korea in the post-Cold War era has played out most 
prominently in the United Nations, the central international institution for multilateral dispute 
resolutions and legal retribution. The increased North Korean nuclear activity in 2016 and the 
anomaly of the United Nations successfully passing two punitive sanctions regimes highlight the 
importance of the UN Security Council as an indispensable existing forum for US-China 
engagement and cooperation on North Korea. These sanctions are significant because the US and 
China are both among the “Permanent 5” (P-5) Security Council members, who all have veto 
power over Security Council resolutions and can effectively block international action against 
North Korea attempted through Security Council resolutions. The Security Council is the only 
international body with the authority to enact multilateral sanctions regimes or otherwise use 
coercive force against countries; therefore, the P-5 members must all agree upon a resolution for 
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any attempts at coercing North Korea by passing binding international measures to be given the 
force of law and international legitimacy. China has historically used its veto to consistently 
shield North Korea from UN censure, with several notable exceptions to be further detailed in 
subsequent sections. This time, however, China has acquiesced to support the international 
community’s increasingly tough sanctions regimes, which holds significant implications for both 
US-China cooperation on North Korea and the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis overall. 
The UN Sanctions implemented by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 
(UNSC Resolution 2270 or Resolution 2270), passed in March 2016 in the aftermath of North 
Korea’s claimed test detonation of a hydrogen bomb in January 2016, were notable in that they 
were the strictest and most comprehensive sanctions regime to date. China’s actions in support of 
these sanctions were unusual because China allowed the resolution to pass the Security Council 
without using its P-5 veto power as per usual on matters regarding North Korea. The resolution 
was originally viewed as a major concession from China, prompting speculation of changing 
Chinese attitudes towards North Korea. However, shortly afterwards, the sanctions faced 
criticism for containing loopholes that allowed China to continue flaunting international 
limitations and conducting trade with North Korea, even in goods considered off-limits under the 
sanctions such as raw minerals, coal and fuel.124 These sanctions, too, therefore represent the 
common sticking point in US-China cooperation on North Korea: US accusations of China 
“cheating” in regulatory attempts and shielding its ally from international punishment. 
The accusations and differences reveal a different Chinese conceptual view, 
demonstrating that even cooperation can have its problems. Chinese diplomatic officials’ 
subsequent statements at press conferences indicate that China still emphasize the ineffectiveness 
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of sanctions alone as a coercion-based approach to North Korea, specifically reaffirming China’s 
continued preference for engagement over coercion and reiterates its commitment to multilateral 
forums on North Korea including resumption of the Six-Party Talks.125 126 This rhetoric is 
consistent with China’s other calls to resume the 6PT and its UN voting record against sanctions 
on the grounds that they were ineffective, which were explained by Chinese Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi in a press conference after the signing of Resolution 2270. These statements reveal the 
ways in which the Chinese interpreted the acts of cooperation and where they saw current value 
or potential engagement opportunities in the initiatives, which in turn offers insight into how US-
China collaboration on North Korea can best be fostered on the grounds of mutual interest.127 
Effects on Continued Cooperation 
The UNSC Resolution 2270 sanctions have prompted additional rounds of US-China 
collaboration, most recently with the Security Council approving extensions of the sanctions 
from March 2016 by passing Resolution 2321 on November 30 of that year.128 These 
supplemental measures were designed to close several loopholes with exports under the previous 
sanctions regime and required the approval of the US and China to come into effect, 
demonstrating an enduring commitment to bilateral cooperation on North Korea supported by 
previous instances of cooperation. Despite the typical mixed messages and spotty sanctions 
enforcement on China’s side, there is nonetheless a large symbolic value to the US-China 
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agreement on these sanctions. China’s willingness to stand with the international community 
against the DPRK is a positive shift that signals China’s opposition to a nuclear North Korea 
even if it is not willing to forego its own benefits from skirting sanctions or compromise its 
security priorities on stability above all else. To build on the communication developed during 
the formation of UNSC Resolution 2270 and coordinate the intensified sanctions obligations 
incurred by both parties, the US and China subsequently interacted in meetings between their 
Korean Peninsula specialist officials, bilateral arms control meetings, phone calls between the 
Chinese Foreign Minister and US Secretary of State, and multiple special Strategic Security 
Dialogue sessions from March through July 2016.129 All of these arrangements provided further 
opportunities for enhancing cooperation on North Korea past the initial sanctions, thus 
improving the sanctions’ effectiveness and fostering the foundations for a stronger working 
partnership on Korean Peninsula affairs. 
The US and China’s collaborative efforts towards the Korean Peninsula security crisis at 
the international and bilateral levels thus proved successful in building a stronger rapport for 
communication between the two great powers, setting the stage for possible future engagement 
on other national security arenas in East Asia. While such security cooperation in the United 
Nations Security Council and other multilateral forums with low enforcement capabilities against 
powerful institutional actors like China tends to be fairly shallow and low-commitment or 
unnecessary to enforce due to unilateral incentives driving compliance,130 China’s willingness to 
participate in security cooperation initiatives with the US does align with both its recognition of 
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the importance of joint US-China engagement on North Korea and its broader pattern of 
increasingly participating in such cooperation. These types of engagement now will pay 
invaluable dividends in the future by facilitating trust-building and policy coordination to help 
bridge the political gaps between the US and China, in turn enabling more efficient joint 
responses to crises on the Korean Peninsula or other areas of mutual interest. 
 
3.4 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The US and China’s previous bilateral engagement on North Korea is among the most 
extensive histories of cooperation for any security-based issue since the countries’ restoration of 
diplomatic relations in 1979. The fundamental significance of the North Korean nuclear security 
crisis to the interests and foreign policy goals of each is also particularly high, making 
cooperation all the more necessary. In further investigating specific conditions for and outcomes 
of previous attempts at policy coordination towards North Korea, this chapter determines that the 
outcome of such cooperation attempts throughout the post-Cold War decades have had 
significant effects on both nation’s foreign policies towards North Korea and each other. An 
analysis of bilateral meeting records, government statements, and independent reports shows that 
mutual engagement on the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue forums like the Six-Party 
Talks or joint policy adoption like UNSC Resolution 2270 does lead to further bilateral 
cooperation in a variety of formats and levels. As a result, the communication and trust-building 
effects of the original occurrence are multiplied. This phenomenon thus indicates a higher 
likelihood of a positive perpetuation of the cooperation spiral towards increased security 
cooperation between the parties and increased trust-building through such cooperation that in 
turn begets even further and deeper cooperation, a dynamic that is indeed observed in US-China 
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Chapter 4  
Beyond Pyongyang: Prospects for Further US-China Security 
Cooperation 
 
 As demonstrated by preeminent US-China diplomatic engagement on the Korean 
Peninsula nuclear security issue over the past two decades – namely the Six-Party Talks and 
multilateral UN sanctions regimes – successful instances of “primary” cooperation do have the 
capability to foster the mutual trust needed to enable and promote continued “secondary” 
security cooperation towards North Korea. While these two case studies primarily elucidate the 
formal and informal US-China cooperation efforts begun in tandem with or in the immediate 
wake of these events, the positive cooperation spiral also extends to shaping a broader pattern of 
increasing security cooperation over time. This holds true even in the absence of major crises in 
North Korea’s nuclear development or purpose-specific multilateral institutions in response, 
notably contributing to an overall pattern of positive growth in US-China consultation on 
security affairs of mutual interest.131 Many policy analysts and high-profile government 
representatives involved in talks with North Korea, including former US 6PT Delegation Head 
Christopher Hill, have interpreted such developments as a corresponding boost to US-China 
relations as a whole.132 
 In addition to indicating cooperation trends on the North Korean issue, the extent to 
which these patterns of US-China collaboration on North Korea can promote cooperative efforts 
on other security issues as well has significant implications for international security. Despite the 
current tension in US-China relations due to the Obama Administration’s “Asia Pivot” foreign 
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policy strategy being perceived by China as a thinly veiled attempt to contain its rise, the general 
trend of the past two decades has been increasing US-China collaboration on security issues. 
This chapter will examine more broadly the role of US-China security cooperation towards 
North Korea in fostering (1) further sustained engagement on North Korea through alternate 
independently-initiated mechanisms, and (2) parallel engagement on three other security issues 
of regional and international concern to the US and China with the greatest discernible linkage to 
being influenced by US-China strategic cooperation on North Korea: Taiwan, military-to-
military relations, and counterterrorism. 
 
4.1 Continuing Cooperation on North Korea 
 
Formal Mechanisms: The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
The momentum from collaboration on North Korea was likely instrumental in leading to 
the establishment of the new primary institutional forum for bilateral security dialogue between 
the two Pacific powers: the annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED), a meeting 
between the top American and Chinese foreign policy and economic officials to discuss issues of 
mutual concern. Established jointly in 2009 to replace its predecessor organization, the Senior 
Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogues from 2006 under the Bush administration, the US-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue has featured North Korean as a key agenda item for 
every year of its existence. A total of five meetings of the Senior Dialogue and Strategic 
Economic Dialogues were convened between 2006-2008, corresponding to an urgent need to 
enhance US-China communication capacities during the Six-Party Talks, while the new SED has 
convened annually for soon-to-be eight years. Building on the Bush administration’s institutional 
design, which emphasized a functional focus on economic issues of mutual interest, the jointly 
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approved adjustments during the Obama Administration expanded the dialogues to cover a wider 
variety of strategic and security sectors. 133 The establishment of both sets of high-level 
consultative channels are indicative of an overall positive trend of US-China engagement and a 
greater consciousness of the mutual interest in increasing US-China security cooperation.134 
The Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis has played an increasingly prominent role in the 
SED discussions. It even “became a dominant issue during the dialogue” as early as the SED’s 
second annual conference in May 2010, which fell shortly after North Korea again raised 
tensions in East Asia by attacking and sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan on March 26, 
2010. 135 These efforts for bilateral communication about North Korea and other security issues 
outside of existing forums or required communications show great initiative and desire to 
cooperate further from both parties, along with a level of recognition for the urgency of such 
efforts. The SED forum has sometimes proven instrumental in directly instigating security 
cooperation across a variety of issues: In 2011, the SED operated 48 new and continuing 
cooperation mechanisms, including breakout sessions on people-to-people exchanges, 
peacekeeping, climate change, and related topics.136 However, on more entrenched and high-risk 
security issues like North Korea, both the US and China have little overlap in their agendas and 
priority issues for negotiations in these forums, causing the SED to often encounter difficulty 
translating noncommittal affirmations of common interests into concrete actions. This was the 
case for the second SED meeting for May 2010, where China and the US actively engaged in 
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discussion on North Korea’s military provocations and reaffirmed their commitment to 
preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, the two ultimately did not sign any 
agreement to this effect.137 This outcome indicates that, in the absence of strategic trust that can 
allow for more meaningful policy coordination or deeper commitments on the issue, increasing 
attempts to deepen security cooperation between the US and China are still hindered by concerns 
on both sides about the goals and intentions of the other, as exacerbated by the security dilemma 
context of the two nations’ power rivalry in East Asia. Thus, the SED forum may in some 
regards appear yet another arena for the US and China to retain opposing viewpoints on North 
Korea, but in fact the engagement opportunities provided by such a mechanism prove valuable 
unto themselves in improving communication to reduce the risk of strategic miscalculations on 
North Korea from either side. 
Additional Dialogue Mechanisms 
 Besides promoting US-China security cooperation through the most prominent such 
forum, the Strategic & Economic Dialogues, the two nations have additionally set up many 
alternate mechanisms both formal and informal over the past decade. Although the SED talks are 
considered the primary platform for discussing North Korea as an issue area within its explicit 
jurisdiction, the US and China have altogether established almost 100 bilateral dialogue 
mechanisms – including more than 60 regular government-to-government dialogues between  
corresponding US and Chinese agencies138 – that they increasingly rely on as channels to foster 
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transparent communication, solve problems, and promote cooperation.139 Among these are the 
US-China Asia-Pacific Consultations, a security dialogue focused on Asia regional issues that 
also featured North Korea on the agenda140 for at least two annual sessions out of its five-year 
existence since May 2011.141 142 The Asia-Pacific Consultations also serve as an opportunity to 
discuss objectives for rounds of US-China dialogue scheduled later in the year through the SED 
as well as the Strategic Security Dialogue and Consultation on People-to-People Exchange.143 
 Furthermore, US-China policy coordination efforts towards North Korea have been 
facilitated by a pattern of increasing direct communication between American and Chinese 
government officials.144 Some of this engagement comes as part of relatively frequent 
consultations on a selection of key regional issues, as with bilateral visits of the US Secretary of 
State to meet with top Chinese officials and discuss US debt negotiations and ASEAN Regional 
Forum affairs as well as the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.145 Other collaboration efforts were 
aimed specifically at addressing or responding to events involving North Korea. Such initiatives 
can involve meetings between the US and China Special Representatives for Korean Peninsula 
Affairs and DPRK Policy, the most recent such meeting taking place on February 24th, 2012 to 
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coincide with the US-North Korea Leap Day talks in Beijing.146 In the event of crises on the 
Korean Peninsula, Washington and Beijing have shown an increasing willingness to arrange 
consultations between their highest foreign policy and national security positions since the 
March 2016 North Korean nuclear test. Although the culminating outcome of the US and 
China’s efforts was to pass UN Resolution 2270 and implement a stricter sanctions regime 
against North Korea, Chinese foreign Minister Wang Yi met with US Secretary of State John 
Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan Rice in a week of private meetings beforehand to 
discuss the circumstances and agree on sanction terms, which eased suspicions and misgivings 
successfully enough to avoid a Chinese veto.147 Although the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
maintained its longstanding position that negotiations should be the ideal approach towards 
North Korea and that sanctions remain an incomplete solution, the parties were nonetheless 
successful in utilizing informal channels to at least temporarily align US-China security policy 
on North Korea, gauge each party’s incentives and interests, and take tangible steps on the issue. 
Given the trust-building, information availability, and crisis management benefits of this direct 
engagement, such bilateral communication is an essential component of developing more 
consistent US-China security cooperation towards North Korea, even if implemented at a smaller 
scale through leader-to-leader phone calls148 or informal meetings at the side of international 
summits and conferences.149  
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4.2 Expanding Cooperation on Mutual Security Issues 
 
Taiwan 
The North Korean nuclear crisis is also interconnected with other regional security 
disputes, such as that of Taiwan.150 China considers Taiwan a renegade Chinese territory that it 
seeks to eventually reunite with the Mainland, while Taiwan hopes to edge towards 
independence or preserve the tentative status quo of de facto self-rule. Taiwan represents the 
other major East Asian issue with the potential to become a flashpoint for US-China conflict due 
to opposing US and Chinese interests and commitments, mandating a special degree of caution 
in managing bilateral interactions on the matter. Chinese international relations scholar Shen 
Dingli notes that “from China’s strategic perspective, Taiwan and North Korea are intrinsically 
linked” because China’s disproportionate influence over North Korea relative to the US gives it a 
bargaining chip that it can utilize for leverage as a guarantee against unfavorable US actions in 
Taiwan.151 From this perspective, regardless of whether said linkage is intended by the Chinese 
or simply perceived by the US,152 China would be able to threaten to loosen its influence or 
weaken its engagement with Pyongyang to purposefully lose ground on the North Korean issue if 
the US moved to assist Taipei in any way that undermined Chinese security interests.153  
China would arguably be willing to prioritize the Taiwan issue at the expense of North 
Korean denuclearization efforts because, unlike the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan is significant not 
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merely as a question of security to China but as a question of national identity and historical 
legitimacy. However, this linked paradigm could also be exploited by the US against China in 
strategic competition, which could involve the US moving closer to Taiwan in an attempt to urge 
Beijing to take stronger action against North Korea if it wants to see a lesser degree of American 
influence over Taiwan.154 Beyond diplomatic bargaining, the Taiwan and North Korea issues are 
also interrelated militarily due to the presence of US Armed Forces in Korea (USFK). The 
USFK’s primary obligation is to deter and defend against any possible armed contingencies on 
the Korean Peninsula, making the US pacific presence “held hostage” to a degree by Pyongyang 
in the sense that it cannot as readily and easily commit to involvement in the Taiwan Strait as it 
otherwise could.155 Thus, to the Chinese, the risk calculus of assessing potential US military 
responses to hostilities or assertive actions on Taiwan hinges on North Korea’s threat status and 
how much involvement is required of the US on the Korean Peninsula. 
US-China cooperation on North Korea is already shown to involve a Taiwan dimension 
that fits with the pattern of positive engagement breeding further cooperation as predicted by the 
spiral model for security cooperation. Glaser and Wang note the importance of these interlinked 
considerations during a period of strengthened pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan during the 
early 2000s: after US President Bush promised in December 2003 to oppose Taiwanese 
President Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait with talk of 
independence, the higher degree of trust from the Chinese in response “likely made it easier for 
[Chinese President] Hu to strengthen cooperation with the United States on North Korea,”156 and 
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was reported to have resulted in China increasing pressure on North Korea in negotiations for the 
Six-Party Talks.157 Thus, in accordance with the spiral model for cooperation, strategic 
concessions on one side prompted reciprocal concessions from the other, demonstrating the type 
of exchange that can over prolonged periods of many such interactions produce mutually 
reinforcing dimensions of trust through cooperation and cooperation through trust.158 Zhao also 
observes that China’s desire to gain Washington’s support on the Taiwan issue has given 
sufficient incentive for cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue such that Beijing has 
“moved from being a passive player to being an active one to demonstrate its cooperative 
goodwill to Washington,” a pattern corroborated by China’s increasing participation in UN 
sanctions regimes against North Korea in recent years compared to its previous habit of vetoing 
such resolutions.159 In these ways, the potential for the North Korean nuclear security dilemma 
and the Taiwan Strait crisis to be viewed as two fronts of a larger US-China geopolitical 
rivalry160 necessitates consideration of both actors’ concerns regarding Taiwan may shape their 
actions and considerations towards North Korea.  
Military-to-Military cooperation 
 Another area of mutual US-China security cooperation with the potential to influence 
their collaboration on North Korea is the growing connections between the American and 
Chinese defense-military establishments. This area of cooperation does not have a strong 
historical precedent for the US and China: although there was a brief period in the 1980s where 
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the Reagan Administration reclassified China under the US Foreign Military Sales program to 
make it eligible for defense technology transfers and military training, these short-lived security 
cooperation attempts were terminated by the US in June 1989 in response to the Tiananmen 
Square incident.161 However, in the 21st Century security environment and alongside 
rejuvenating US-China ties, the potential for bilateral defense security collaboration is once 
again on the rise, especially in maritime affairs and non-traditional security issues. Despite the 
escalating tensions between China and the US in the South China Sea, global maritime commons 
outside of nationally contested areas are a neutral ground for engagement and could provide an 
arena to engage in trust-building joint exercises on issues of mutual US-China interest with a 
maritime component, including arms and narcotics trafficking, piracy, illegal immigration, and 
fishing regulation.162 
Furthermore, the US and China already recognize the need for such collaboration and do 
engage in cooperation in civil maritime security affairs between the US Coast Guard and its 
counterparts in China. A US Coast Guard Liaison to the US Embassy in Beijing reported that 
since 2005, “the civil maritime relationship has expanded in every front, with bilateral and 
multilateral efforts in port security, search and rescue, fisheries law enforcement and other 
areas.”163 Continuing the trend of strengthening and building on these existing lines of 
cooperation and communication between the US and Chinese defense and military institutions 
offers significant potential benefits in terms of enhancing the nations’ capacity to coordinate on 
other mutual security issues as well. These forums for engagement can provide a platform for the 
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US and China to conduct dialogue and share important strategic information about their 
intentions, capabilities, and preferences on bilateral concerns such as North Korea,164 which 
would be in both parties’ interests and is supported by this pattern of increasing bilateral security 
engagement. Finally, since the military-to-military cooperation in security-related capacities is an 
inherently sensitive matter under security dilemma conditions, it is one of the first areas in which 
collaboration is reduced during times of tension and one of the last areas to restore the full extent 
of cooperation after such incidents.165 As a result, the capacity of US-China security cooperation 
to continue expanding in this area past its current extent is a positive indicator of the value of 
such cooperation as an indicator of at least incrementally increasing trust in the US-China 
relationship as a result of the trust-cooperation paradigm set into motion by previously described 
bilateral engagement on security issues in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. 
Counterterrorism  
In particular, efforts to increase US-China cooperation on security issues increased 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, regardless of the initially anti-China rhetoric of the Bush 
administration.166 As part of its search to build an international counterterrorism coalition and 
address an increasingly hostile North Korea that Bush famously deemed part of an “Axis of 
Evil” in a speech following 9/11, the US turned to China to increase its strategic cooperation and 
include it in the US “War on Terror” efforts. During this period, the US did indeed engage China 
on terrorism-related issues and related security concerns to a greater degree than it had 
previously through a “two-way flow of senior leaders…as well as extensive consultations and 
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interactions between officials overseeing global trade, export control, nonproliferation, the 
Korean Peninsula, and the War on Terror.”167 This counterterrorism mandate, however, 
corresponded with increased suppression of Uighur ethnic minority rights by Chinese authorities 
in Xinjiang Province, drawing criticism from international observers that Beijing has used the 
cooperation as political cover for pursuing its own domestic security interests in preserving 
internal stability and eliminating perceived extremist threats along its western border.  168  
The US sought to link these counterterrorism cooperation efforts to the Korean Peninsula 
issue explicitly: at the initial visit between President Bush and former Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin following the 9/11 attacks, Bush and the US administration made additional calls for 
greater Sino-American collaboration in areas of overlapping interest, specifically including 
promotion of stability on the Korean Peninsula alongside opposition to terrorism.169 Besides just 
the US’s expectations of reciprocal security collaboration from Beijing, China also faced greater 
international pressure to take a stance on North Korea more consistent with its own stakes and 
interests in the issue as a result of the high-visibility US-China cooperation in the war on terror, 
which meant advocacy for a stricter Chinese North Korea policy more befitting a “responsible 
stakeholder” in the global system.170 In response, Chinese diplomatic efforts to address the 
DPRK’s nuclear weapon development and continued missile testing though bilateral China-
DPRK channels reportedly increased in subsequent years, with some of North Korea’s self-
imposed restrictions on missile testing in the early 2000s “likely a partial result of Chinese 
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intervention.”171 These efforts in nonproliferation and arms control also reflect a growing effort 
on the part of the Chinese to join the US in encouraging and building nonproliferation regimes in 
Asia, which again was notably present in the Sino-US Joint Statement on South Asia in 1998 that 
addressed nuclear testing and weaponization issues following the nuclear tests by Pakistan and 
India that same year.172 These increasing attempts between the US and China to jointly address 
nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and other transnational strategic threats in diplomatic and 
military-to-military capacities are therefore indicative of the converging interests of both parties 
around common security issues and provide a valuable foundation of trust and engagement upon 
which to increase similar security cooperation towards North Korea.173  
The fact that the US explicitly sought to include China in a multilateral coalition on 
security matters thus stands as a positive indicator of a trend towards greater trust and 
willingness to facilitate further joint engagement on security issues within the context of US-
China relations. However, this particular type of cooperation within the counterterrorism 
coalition as an international regime does not appear to reflect a particularly deep or 
institutionalized level of US-China cooperation; since China had unilateral incentives to 
voluntarily cooperate with the US in the War on Terror as an opportunity to gain political cover 
to pursue its own agenda of strategic repression, it was not likely to defect from this cooperative 
engagement anyway, regardless of whether or not it actually prioritized cooperating with the 
US.174 Nonetheless, the US and China’s willingness to at least engage in strategic coordination 
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on this mutual issue does at least correlate to the cooperation spiral trend in terms of a gradually 
increasing number of security cooperation efforts.175 As with the aforementioned US-China 
cooperation on parallel security dimensions such as military-to-military relations, even if no 
immediate increases in the depth of security cooperation are apparent, this type of strategic 
coordination is still significant for building mutual trust gradually through positive engagement 
on a smaller-scale level or on issues of lower strategic value to the US and China’s core interests, 
which can foster cooperation on more valuable issues once deeper trust to allow such voluntary 
vulnerability through cooperation high-stakes issues has developed.  
 
4.3 Chapter Conclusions 
 
As the examples of interconnectedness between the North Korean nuclear crisis and the 
Taiwan Straits crisis, military-to-military relations, and counterterrorism cooperation 
demonstrated throughout Chapter 4 indicate, previous US-China cooperation on the North 
Korean crisis has had beneficial effects on fostering security cooperation and the conditions for 
increased trust-building in other dimensions of strategic security importance to the US and China 
outside of the Korean Peninsula. In addition, these parallel security initiatives have the potential 
to foster a positive cooperation spiral linking the trust and cooperation in these areas to 
increasing the trust between the US and China in respectively working towards a coordinated 
approach to the Korean Peninsula on the basis of this strengthened trust. Therefore, although it is 
still beneficial that increased US-China engagement as a result of the North Korean issue is 
spreading “horizontally” to foster continued engagement in other areas more so than “vertically” 
to constitute repeated and consistent patterns of trust-building and cooperation on North Korea, 
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the phenomenon poses a challenge to the US and China moving forward in developing their joint 
approach to North Korea, ultimately reflecting the prevalence of the strategic differences in 
interest and approach between China and the US that still inhibit deeper cooperation that could 























Chapter 5  
Conclusions and Next Steps: Security Implications in a Changing World 
  
Despite common perceptions of North Korea as an insurmountable roadblock and 
invariable source of dissent in US-China relations, the preceding four chapters have 
demonstrated that the post-Cold War evolution of the Korean Peninsula nuclear security crisis 
has in fact given sufficient impetus for the US and China to engage in more frequent and 
significant security cooperation than before. The two nations’ central roles in the issue, along 
with their mutual national security interests in bringing about a secure and stable Korean 
Peninsula, serve to position North Korea as a unique opportunity for breakthrough US-China 
security cooperation where strategic distrust and competition fueled by a bilateral security 
dilemma would otherwise hinder such engagement. Notable instances of constructive US-China 
engagement on North Korea – namely the Six-Party Talks from 2003-2007 and the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 sanctions – have indeed prompted further security 
cooperation on North Korea in their wake, and have also contributed to patterns of closer US-
China engagement on other East Asian security issues in recent years. This increased cooperation 
represents a positive direction for US-China relations overall, ideally helping to foster 
communication and trust alongside facilitating greater policy coordination efforts to jointly craft 
a more stable international system. 
These findings indicating that the Korean Peninsula can be conducive to US-China 
cooperation are particularly relevant moving forward in a tense yet evolving East Asian security 
context, with an increasingly nuclear-capable North Korea against a backdrop of concerned US 
allies and suspicious or accusatory rhetoric tainting the atmosphere for cooperation between the 
US and China. North Korea’s recent developments and their implications point to the potentially 
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wide-ranging consequences of a Korean Peninsula nuclear dilemma or similar international 
security crisis allowed to grow unchecked in the space afforded by US-China distrust, making 
greater US-China security cooperation as established in this thesis invaluable to global security. 
This chapter will seek to briefly situate increasing US-China security cooperation within 
the current and long-term trajectories for the Korean Peninsula and the US-China bilateral 
relationship. First, this section will summarize the main findings of this thesis in regard to 
building US-China strategic trust through security cooperation engagement on North Korea, 
reviewing the connections between these main takeaways and theories of international relations 
as well as evidence from key case studies of US-China security cooperation on both North Korea 
and interrelated security cooperation advances on other parallel issues. The second section will 
enumerate significant developments in these areas since the beginning of the Trump presidency 
in the US and assess the particular challenges and opportunities now facing the new 
administration regarding North Korea and China. The thesis concludes by outlining security 
experts’ predictions for the Korean Peninsula’s future and providing policy recommendations for 
further advancing US-China trust in relation to strategic dimensions of the Korean Peninsula 
nuclear crisis, thus highlighting the role of US-China cooperation in promoting favorable 
outcomes and mitigating unfavorable externalities. The conclusion section as a whole serves as a 
final analysis of the net impact of US-China cooperation on North Korea for US-China relations 
and the implications of such engagement for regional and global stability. In doing so, the thesis 
reiterates the importance of the dynamics uncovered by addressing the trust-cooperation spiral of 




5.1 A Brief Summary 
 
The research and findings expounded throughout this thesis demonstrate that US-China 
engagement or neglect on jointly addressing the North Korean nuclear security issue not only 
affects the development of the nuclear crisis, but also the progression and future of the US-China 
bilateral relationship itself. Such joint collaboration on the Korean Peninsula issue is shown to 
provide the precedent and mechanisms to increase further bilateral cooperation in the context of 
both the Korean Peninsula and other interrelated mutual security issues, even if such cooperation 
is insufficient to overcome the shared suspicions and trust deficit that plague US-China relations 
as the current hegemon and rising power in world politics respectively.  
The main point of analysis in drawing these conclusions throughout the thesis is 
assessing the intersections between security cooperation and strategic trust under a security 
dilemma dynamic exhibiting tensions between two major powers in the international system. The 
theoretical context of US-China relations within which the North Korea issue should be 
understood is characterized by the dynamics enumerated in Chapter 2: the combination of a 
pervasive US-China security dilemma and a period of possible great power transition has given 
rise to the notion of a “Thucydides Trap,” where power transition under a security dilemma such 
as the contemporary US-China situation is argued to lead to conflict. While other factors 
described by institutionalist and realist theory indicate that a US-China conflict might be less 
likely than commonly assumed, the mutual recognition of these dangers on the part of the US 
and China has prompted the parties to initiate low-depth but high-level security cooperation on 




The impact of this initial cooperation despite the presence of mutual distrust is to set the 
US-China engagement on North Korea within the context of a spiral model for strategic 
interactions in international relations, whereby actions towards the other party that demonstrate 
either tension and suspicion or trust and engagement in turn prompt reciprocal responses in a 
cyclical pattern of increasing intensity. When actions promoting security cooperation are taken 
within this spiral, the level of cooperation increases over time and is both facilitated by and 
formative of a corresponding increase in the level of trust between parties, thus propagating the 
spiral indefinitely to the benefit of bilateral relations as a whole. Therefore, Chapters 1 and 2 as a 
whole combine theoretical and practical perspectives of US-China cooperation with key concepts 
about the intersections between security cooperation and trust, which they then expand upon to 
contextualize the US-China political impasse surrounding North Korea and provide a critical 
assessment pointing to likely long-term gains and progress through increasing strategic trust. 
Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis draw upon this framework of analysis for US-China 
engagement on North Korea and apply the concepts of trust-cooperation linkages and 
cooperation spirals to instances of bilateral US-China cooperation in relation to the North Korea 
issue, both on the nuclear crisis itself and in parallel areas of US-China collaboration. As 
demonstrated by the notable examples of the Six-Party Talks from 2003-2007 and the UNSC 
Resolution 2270 sanctions in 2016, US-China cooperation is emblematic of strengthening trust 
through cooperation. These dynamics are also shown to be key instigators for further security 
cooperation and strategic trust-building in other areas of US-China cooperation on Taiwan, joint 
military affairs, and global counterterrorism efforts. These findings indicating the value of 
collaboration on North Korea in US-China strategic interactions as not an opportunity to work 
towards common goals of denuclearization and regional stability, but also an invaluable chance 
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to enable security cooperation that helps foster mutually-reinforcing dynamics of trust and 
cooperation into the future, which will have a positive impact for reducing US-China tensions 
and improving the bilateral relationship as a whole.  
Thus, the thesis suggests a need to slightly recalibrate common interpretations of the role 
of the North Korean nuclear crisis within US-China relations: instead of focusing only on the 
persisting trust deficit as an obstacle to deeper-level US-China security cooperation, the gradual 
role of continuing even shallower, lower-level, and parallel-issue cooperation efforts as with the 
case studies and trend analyses analyzed in this thesis, should be acknowledged for the ways in 
which the overall level of strategic in bilateral US-China relations is gradually improving as a 
result of the increase in this US-China security cooperation on North Korea. Therefore, although 
a challenging trust deficit does persist in US-China relations, the trust-cooperation spiral on the 
North Korean nuclear security crisis forms a mutually-reinforcing process of increasing security 
cooperation that overall does have a positive effect on reducing the suspicions and tensions 
underlying the relationship and preventing greater mutual understanding, even if such 
cooperation has been unable so far to significantly counteract the factors perpetuating the US and 
China’s political stalemate on North Korea. 
 
5.2 Recent Developments: New Administration, New Direction? 
 
Transitions between US presidents have often precipitated shifts in US dealings with both 
China and North Korea, and the nascent administration of President Donald Trump is shaping up 
to be a similar story. Whereas George W. Bush championed coercive non-engagement and 
Barack Obama pursued “strategic patience” with North Korea, Trump remains a wild card in 
terms of prescribing a cohesive ideology or policy approach towards these pressing security 
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concerns. Trump’s seemingly anti-China comments on the campaign trail, including advocating 
for imposing up to 45% tariffs on imported Chinese goods even at the risk of a US-China trade 
war,176 have so far been met with wary yet measured caution from Beijing in apparent 
acknowledgment of the president’s penchant for unpredictability and his administration’s relative 
deficit of diplomatic or policymaking experience. 
Furthermore, by taking a phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen in early 
December of 2016 – the first between American and Taiwanese leaders since the adoption of the 
“One China Policy” in 1979 – Trump threatened to significantly shift the status quo consensus in 
US-China relations upon which current relations and bilateral cooperation on issues like North 
Korea are made possible.177 The One China policy is the basis for peaceful US-China-Taiwan 
relations and stability in the Taiwan Strait, under which the US agrees that Taiwan is part of “one 
China,” but leaves the term strategically undefined to allow for US engagement with both China 
and Taiwan.178 However, the US does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; by 
interacting with the Taiwanese leadership in official capacity, Trump’s call suggested partial 
recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty that US officials have meticulously avoided thus far for 
fear of antagonizing Beijing. The situation risked becoming a political roadblock in US-China 
relations until Secretary of State Rex Tillerson walked back Trump’s comments weeks later by 
reaffirming US commitment to upholding the policy, an essential foundation for cooperative US-
China engagement.179 
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Trump’s few actions so far on the North Korea issue have been similarly inconsistent, 
despite the rapid acceleration of North Korea’s weapons testing since Trump’s inauguration 
firmly establishing the Korean Peninsula as one of the thorniest and most urgent foreign policy 
puzzles his administration will be charged with tackling. As if to test the new president’s 
reactions early in his term, North Korea has once again raised its provocations to new heights in 
2017 by claiming to possess ICBMs on January 1st, launching a medium-range ballistic missile 
on February 11th, and firing four more of these missiles consecutively on March 6th, some of 
which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan. Tracing back 
to campaign promises, Trump previously stated that he would be willing to meet with the North 
Korean leadership in person, a potentially huge step towards restarting dialogues or at least 
reopening a source of direct information about the Kim regime through communication that had 
been closed to previous US presidents for decades.  
However, a bilateral US-North Korea meeting scheduled for late February 2017 was 
called off by the US following the DPRK’s mid-range ballistic missile launch into the Sea of 
Japan on February 11th, dashing the hopes of engagement advocates and Chinese foreign policy 
leaders who have long insisted upon dialogue as a more effective US approach than sanctions.180 
While a summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping from April 6-7, 2017 at Mar-
a-Lago in Florida featured the increasing belligerence of North Korea as a top agenda item, the 
talks failed to produce any constructive discussion or concrete action plans for a US-China joint 
approach to North Korea despite the unscripted format designed to facilitate a more open 
exchange of ideas beyond restating foreign policy points.181 Additionally, Trump has utilized 
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social media and verbal platforms to criticize China for its lenience on North Korea and not 
leveraging the full extent of its supposed influence over the DPRK to pressure it on UN 
sanctions. Despite Chinese insistence that the nation’s influence over North Korea is 
substantially lower than commonly perceived, this stance of blaming the lagging progress in 
denuclearization efforts on China is not new on the US side. This indicates that Trump has 
charted a course towards not only reinforcing existing obstacles separating American and 
Chinese approaches to cooperation on North Korea, but also creating new ones by undermining 
the delicate diplomatic basis for this cooperation itself. 
 
5.3 Forward Predictions and Implications: The Future of the Korean Peninsula Security 
Crisis 
 
 With North Korea having demonstrated possession of nuclear devices with ranges 
including Japan and Korea while also visibly accelerating its technical prowess closer and closer 
to mobilizing ICBM-mounted warheads capable of striking US territory, the possibility of a fully 
nuclear North Korea is increasingly realistic. Indeed, it appears as though North Korea scholar 
David Kang’s interpretation of the DPRK’s drive for nuclear development as simply a 
“bargaining chip” intended to be traded away to extract concessions from international 
negotiation182 is no longer a plausible possibility: North Korea’s nuclear weapons are real and 
dangerous, and its dictator Kim Jong Un has given ample indication of his refusal to surrender 
them completely.183 
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 In light of North Korea’s financial and political resilience despite six sets of targeted 
international sanctions to date, its dogged insistence on enhancing its nuclear capability to pose a 
credible threat, and its indication of being on the technological cusp of actualizing this objective, 
North Korea appears well on the way to attaining the nuclear state status it seeks. Although 
North Korea has completed five nuclear tests and additional missile, rocket, and ICBM tests, its 
ability to sufficiently miniaturize its nuclear warheads for ranged deployment remains unseen. A 
feasibly nuclearized Korean Peninsula – even if the DPRK’s weapons are not fully operable for 
medium- or long-range targets – is thus the most likely contingency to play out in the current 
predicament, regardless of any international efforts short of a miraculous diplomatic about-face 
to stringent and intensively coordinated multilateral action.184  
However unlikely, it may still be possible to utilize stricter sanctions to prevent North 
Korea from acquiring the technology for this final step or to persuade it to limit some of its 
nuclear activities in exchange for concessions like aid and security guarantees. The success of 
such negotiations, though, would still ultimately depend on the DPRK leadership’s intentions 
and the degree of value it ascribes to its nuclear program, if anything short of absolute 
essentiality for national preservation and legitimacy. If North Korea is to be prevented from 
upgrading its symbolic possession of nuclear devices to a finalized operational nuclear deterrent, 
the US and China will both play integral roles in implementing the designated international 
approach. Whether coercive or interactive, the tactics must be adopted thoroughly by both the 
US and China with careful coordination and communication to reduce the risk of strategic 
miscalculation on either side. With the precedent of initially successful collaboration attempts 
like the 6PT and UN Sanctions as well as the established prospects of improved security 
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cooperation going forward, US-China coordination thus emerges as a critical component 
facilitate effective action towards the unique and multifaced challenged posed by North Korea’s 
nuclear program. 
 As established by the results of the featured case study analyses in this thesis, a rapidly 
nuclearizing North Korea has generally facilitated greater US-China engagement by creating a 
greater necessity for bilateral cooperation, which prompts the nations to progress with further 
security coordination as predicted by the cooperation spiral model. However, it is less feasible to 
discern the degree to which this cooperation has so far definitively served to improve the conduct 
or quality of US-China diplomatic relations in practice. This is because the element of security 
cooperation on North Korea and related issues is difficult if not impossible to isolate from the 
myriad other domestic and international factors influencing the overall state of US-China 
relations over a given period of time, making significant analysis to support this conclusion 
inviable. Therefore, this thesis has avoided making the explicit argument that the North Korea 
security cooperation issue has led directly to tangible improvements in their bilateral ties that 
could be pinpointed as specific policies or exchanges. However, in a subtle and indirect manner, 
the increased bilateral communication and additional opportunities for interaction in diplomatic 
negotiation forums has afforded the American and Chinese leadership the opportunity to build 
trust and gain greater familiarity with their counterparts’ thinking and policymaking processes. 
Given that mutual distrust and misunderstanding are key inhibitors preventing the US and China 
from building deeper collaborative capacities and engaging in cooperative measures on security 
issues of regional and international concern, these patterns of engagement on North Korea will 
likely prove valuable in working to gradually facilitate a warming of US-China ties to a certain 
extent despite not being a directly determinable cause of such developments. The positive 
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patterns of increasing US-China bilateral and multilateral engagement on the issue in the post-
Soviet Union period, therefore, indicate that addressing the crisis will lead to more US-China 
dialogue and opportunities for deeper cooperation on North Korea and other issue areas in the 
future. 
 Although this type of wholesale warming of US-China bilateral ties or even a key 
breakthrough on mutual national security issues like Taiwan as a result of US-China cooperation 
on North Korea has yet to happen, such a situation might conceivably emerge amidst the 
escalation of the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis currently under way. If North Korea is able to 
develop deliverable ICBM-mounted nuclear weapons, its expanded range – which would likely 
include Hawaii or the US West Coast – would force the US to considerably alter its strategic 
calculus regarding North Korea, possibly causing it to value engagement and coercion strategies 
differently or prioritize different goals for the Korean Peninsula. While this shift in thinking 
could polarize the US and China’s views and preferred strategies for the issue, making security 
cooperation on North Korea even harder than before, the change could also stand to bring 
Beijing and Washington closer together, depending in great part upon the nature of the 
realignment and degree of responsiveness of the other party. By raising the stakes of the US and 
Chinese responses to a more dangerous nuclear-armed North Korea, this scenario would also 
heighten the risk of conflict in reaction to misjudged decisions, further incentivizing cooperation. 
 In consideration of the challenges and opportunities for US-China security cooperation 
on North Korea outlined in this thesis and their significant interrelatedness with the state of US-
China bilateral relations more broadly, the thesis thus arrives at several key factors that could be 
identified as policy recommendations for addressing the unilateral and bilateral concerns 
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inhibiting a coordinated US-China approach185 to North Korea that can successfully advance the 
crisis towards both parties’ desired outcomes of a stabilized and denuclearized Korean Peninsula.  
 First, the initial stage of implementing this agenda for further US-China strategic 
cooperation on North Korea would entail resuming multilateral forums such as the Six-Party 
Talks and expanding the institutional capacity and jurisdiction of key bilateral forums for 
discussing security concerns in relation to the nuclear crisis. It is fundamentally necessary to first 
maintain and expand these platforms for engagement if a greater depth of engagement is to 
occur. Diplomatic coordination would send mutual signals of willingness to interact and 
exchange views on the North Korean issue, thus providing an opportunity to appease strategic 
distrust through positive shows of intentions. These dialogue and policy coordination forums 
would also provide an arena for communication and crisis management to minimize the risk of 
strategic miscalculations in the face of unexpected crisis contingencies.186 
 Second, the US and China should actively pursue cooperation in areas of lesser strategic 
contention, such as deepening military-to-military discussion and joint exercises as described in 
Chapter 4 or by deepening the extent of “win-win” economic cooperation by expanding trade 
and lowering barriers to trade and investment. This would offer a comparatively low-risk area in 
which to cooperate that produces immediate economic benefits for both and can be used to great 
effectiveness to spur the trust-building process in the general bilateral relationship. This higher 
level of strategic trust can then be transferred to fostering security cooperation on the North 
Korean nuclear issue. 
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 Finally, the US and China should take measures to decrease their strategic hedging 
against each other in East Asia and instead seek to build an integrated regional security regime of 
institutions, both financial and political, that engage both the US and China in new institutions 
that are inclusive of both sides rather than exclusive. Exclusive institutions, such as the China-
founded Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank or the formerly proposed US-led Trans-
Pacific Partnership trade agreement, serve to heighten the security dilemma conditions and 
suspicions of foul intent between the two nations, while economic and security institutions 
specifically for East Asian regional issues featuring the US and China as equal partners would 
provide additional forums for trust-building and additional arenas in which to cooperate, ideally 
providing the impetus to develop the same dynamics for the North Korean issue. 187 
Ultimately, the US and China adopting a coordinated approach in implementation of 
these steps will be critical. Since these prospects will become increasingly feasible188 in the 
future after further rounds of security cooperation and trust-building through engagement on 
North Korea as predicted by the prevailing cooperation spiral dynamic, these policy 
recommendations bode well for building upon and contributing to the patterns of increasing US-
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